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ORGAN HARVESTS FROM THE LEGALLY
INCOMPETENT: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST
COMM .ED ALTRUISM
Abstract: Organ transplants may offer the best hope of long term survival
for individuals afflicted with certain cancers or other debilitating diseases.
The hope that a transplant may inspire in an organ recipient should not,
however; be the determinative factor when the proposed source of the organ is
incompetent. Competent adults are not compelled to act altruistically by
undergoing a surgical invasion for the benefit of third parties. Children
and mentally incompetent adults should likewise be protected from such
compelled altruism. Case by case adjudication of petitions to harvest organs
from incompetents are inevitably driVen by a concern for the recipient and
an unwarranted deference to parental authority, and not by concerns for
the autonomy and well being ,of the incompetent donor. This Note argues
that organ harvests from legal incompetents should be statutorily prohib-
ited.
INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that advances in medical science which hold the
promise of resolving questions of life and death tend to create ethical
dilemmas of right and wrong. 1 Organ transplants are one such ad-
vance. An organ transplant often offers the best hope of long term
survival from certain cancers and other debilitating diseases. 2 But that
best hope cannot be realized unless a close, genetically matched or-
gan can be quickly obtained. There are two sources of organs: those
that are donated and those that are harvested.. Organs are "donated"
by competent adults who voluntarily and altruistically consent to give
what is sometimes called, "the greatest gift."3 Organs are "harvested"
from cadavers or living related children and mentally disabled
adults—individuals who are unable to give a competent, valid con-
1 See, e.g., B.D. Colett, Whatever Happened to Baby Jane Doe? And Other Cases Involving Re-
productive Ethics, in HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 2 (1994).
2 See Deane L. Wolcott et al., Psychiatric Aspects of Bone Marrow nansplantation: A Review
and Current Issues, 4 PSYCHIATRIC MED. 299, 299 (1987) (hereinafter BMT Review].
3 See Hal Daniel Friedman, The Greatest Gift, But At Mat Cost?—Objections to Court-
Compelled Organ Donation In Aid of a Family Member; 30 J. PAM. L. 605, 620 (1991-92) (here-
inafter Greatest Gift]; infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
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sent. 4
 It is this latter method of obtaining organs that poses the ethical
dilemma: may the altruistic gift of an organ be compelled from a legal
incompetent?5
 Absent exigent circumstances, medical personnel must
obtain parental or guardian consent before providing necessary
medical treatment to children and mentally disabled adults. 6 The re-
quirement that parental consent be obtained is based on the principle
that children and mentally disabled adults lack the maturity or ability
to understand the consequences of accepting or foregoing treat-
ment. 7
 Parental consent is considered sufficient to authorize neces-
sary medical treatment on the grounds that parents are in the best
position to determine and act on behalf of their children's best inter-
ests. 8
 For those same reasons, when medical treatment is unnecessary,
but will improve the health of the child or mentally disabled adult,
parental consent is again both necessary and sufficient,
The sufficiency of a parent or guardian's consent is less clear,
however, when the treatment is medically unnecessary and the
beneficiary of the treatment is a third partyffl—such is the case when a
See Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interest Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Pavia
Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Pa-
tients, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 283, 308 (1991) (stating: "A person cannot make an informed
decision if she lacks the capacity to reason and make judgments, her decision is not volun-
tary, and she lacks a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of alternatives as well as
the nature and prognosis of the disease").
6 See id.
6
 Physicians may treat children without parental consent if there is a risk to life or
limb. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 117
& n.37 (5th ed. 1984). Furthermore, the state's interest in protecting the public health
and welfare may override the need for parental consent. See, e.g., Jacobsen v Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of compulsory vaccines).
7 See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App. 1979, writ denied); Griffith, supra
note 4. at 308; cf. Bach v Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966) (holding that the consent of a minor emancipated by marriage was sufficient to
authorize medically unnecessary treatment).
See Charles H. Baron, Live Organ and Tissue Dansplants from Minor Donors in Massachu-
setts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159, 165 (1975). Although the parental right to direct a child's up-
bringing has been recognized as a fundamental right, the state may, under its parens patria
power, burden that right or terminate parental rights altogether. See, e.g., In re Tabatha R. v.
Ronda R., 587 N.W.2d 109, 115, 119 (Neb. 1998) (upholding an order removing a child
from the care of the parents when one parent was incarcerated and the other was in an
institution for the criminally insane). See also Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (overriding guardian's decisions regarding a minor's religious upbringing); Sherr
v. Northport, 672 F. Supp. 81, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (overriding parents' objections to com-
pulsory immunizations for their school-age child).
9 See William J. Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 891, 892 (1959).
10 See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (physician and hospi-
tal refused to transplant a kidney from a seven year-old to her twin sister without a court
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parent or guardian wishes.to harvest an organ from a child or ward to
save a sibling." In this context, the interests of the incompetent no
longer drive the medical treatment. 12 Rather, the incompetent's inter-
ests must be reconciled with or subsumed beneath the family and
doctor's understandable desire to save the sibling. 13 Yet, despite the
absence of medical necessity or medical benefit, when confronted
with petitions to harvest organs front incompetents, courts generally
retreat behind presumptions of parental beneficence and give these
procedures the blessing of judicial approval."
In contrast, competent adults are under no compulsion to submit
to organ harvests for the benefit of third parties. 15 Adults may decline
to be tested for initial compatibility, and if compatible, may stop the
process at any time." Both the common law doctrine of informed
order declaring that the parents had the right to consent on the child donor's behalf);
Curran, supra note 9, at 892; Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights of Children
and Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 213, 216-17
(1994-95).
SeeJoel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors
from the Pressure to Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (1995) (stating that "[u]nlike medical
care provided to improve the health of a patient, organ donation provides no therapeutic
benefit to the organ donor"); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 642 N.E.2d
1160, 1162 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "bone marrow is an organ"). This Note
only specifically addresses bone marrow and kidney harvests, but the argument applies to
other organ harvests as well.
12 See Curran, supra note 9, at 892.
13 See Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499; Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of
Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 393 (1997); cf. Curran v.
Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1344-45 (Ill. 1990).
14 See Little. 576 S.W.2d at 497 (citing John A. Robertson, Organ Donation by Incompetents
and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLIMA. L. Rev. 48, 53 (1976)) (stating: "Judicial
approval for intra-family transplants from incompetent donors has been granted in most
cases.").
15 See generally McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.M 90 (1978) (refusing to compel a com-
petent adult to undergo a bone marrow transplant for the benefit of his cousin).
16See ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IM-
PACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 289 (1977) [hereinafter GIFT OF Lin] (noting the
case of a daughter who backed out the night before she was to donate a kidney to her
mother). See generally Larne Friedman Ross et al., Ethics of a Paired-Kidney-Exchange Program,
337 New ENG. J. MED. 1392, (1997), available at Chttp://www.nejm.org/content/1997/
0336/0024/1752.asp>. Friedman Ross et al. advocate a kidney exchange program that
addresses the problem of adult donors withdrawing their consent at the last minute. Un-
der this model, an individual who is willing to donate a kidney but who is a poor tissue
match for his or her ill recipient would be paired with a second mismatched pair and the
kidneys would essentially be bartered between them: willing Donor A would provide a
kidney to Recipient B, and willing Donor B would provide a kidney to Recipient A. The
proponents warn, however, that the transplants would have to take place simultaneously to
eliminate the possibility that Donor B might withdraw her consent after D01102' A had al-
ready undergone surgery. See id.
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consent and the rejection of a general duty to rescue support the
competent adult's decision to assist or ignore the needs of third par-
ties. 17
 Shnilarly, competent adults may prohibit post-mortem harvests
of their organs by making those wishes known by an advance direc-
ave.'s
Society has long accepted and expected that in certain contexts
the law will treat the legally competent differently from the legally in-
competent. 19
 Contract and labor laws, for example, prevent the latter
group from forming contracts or working in particular industries. 20
These distinctions are justified, in part, by society's interest in protect-
ing those who are unable to protect themselves because of age or
mental infirmity. 21
 Nevertheless, when courts and legislatures rush to
defend legally competent donors from compelled harvests but defer
to third-party interests when faced with legally incompetent donors,
the differences take on a disturbing texture.22
17 See, e.g., Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Iowa 1983) (refusing to disclose
identity of a potential bone marrow donor in a hospital donor registry to an individual
suffering from leukemia); McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91; see also Greatest Gift, supra note 3,
at 620 (arguing that even in the limited contexts in which states have found a duty to res-
cue, no legislature has gone so far as to require that the rescuer put him or herself at risk).
But see Fordham E. Huffman, Comment, Coerced Donation of Body Tissue: Can We Live with
McFall v. Shimp F 40 Oxio ST. L.J. 409, 414-22 (1979) (articulating four criteria which, if
satisfied, would permit a patient to obtain a court order requiring an unwilling donor to
undergo an organ harvest under threat of civil and criminal penalties).
18 See Aaron Spitall, Mandated Choice for Organ Donation: Time to Give it a Thy, 125 AN-
NALs INTERNAL MED. 66 (1996), available at <http://www.acponline. org ./jotumals/ an-
nals/>, under Past Issues (noting that a Gallup poll confirmed the general sense that the
individual, not the family, shoUld make the decision about post-mortem organ donations,
and further, that the family should not be able to override advance directives); cf. Perry v.
Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 886 F. Stipp. 1551, 1561-62 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that
the use of deception to obtain a family's consent to extensive post-mortem donation was
sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
12 See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that it may be necessary for states to adopt special
procedures in order to protect the liberty interests of incompetent patients); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (holding that it is
the manner in which the state preserves and upholds the rights, rather than the substance
of those rights, that distinguishes an incompetent from a competent individual).
" See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (1998) (child labor regulations); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 12(2) (b), (c) (1979).
21 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428 (stating: "The 'best interests' of an incompetent per-
son are not necessarily served by imposing on such persons results not mandated as to
competent persons similarly situated.... To protect the incompetent person within its
power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that
person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons.").
22See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969); Wag 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91;
Louise Harmon, Falling Off The Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment,
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This Note will argue that organ harvests from children and men-
tally disabled adults should be categorically prohibited." Case-by-case
adjudications of petitions to harvest organs from these individuals
inevitably turn on a balance of the relative benefits and harms arising
from organ transplants. 24 The cost-benefit analysis is flawed for two
reasons." First, courts refuse such a balance of benefits and harms
when asked to compel competent adults to donate organs. 26 Second,
the information on which the cost-benefit analysis is based is both in-
complete and incorrect. 27 Moreover, using the most vulnerable mem-
bers of society to shield us from the pain of a loved one's illness or
imminent death is unfair. 28 It forces the child or mentally disabled
adult to take on life and death burdens for which they are wholly un-
prepared and exposes them to harms from which they are wholly un-
protected. 29 Only legislation which requires that individuals be fully
competent to give an informed, meaningful consent before being
candidates for live organ donations can alleviate the inherent dangers
of adjudicating these issues case-bycase. 30
Part I of this Note provides an overview of organ transplantation
and discusses the psychological effects and family dynamics that color
the experience of donors and recipients. This foundation is necessary
to critically examine the speculative psychological benefits courts rely
on when they authorize organ harvests from children and the men-
tally disabled. 51 Part II surveys the major case law in this area and
notes a recent case which goes beyond the mere authorization to bar-
WO YALE L.J. 1,57 (1990) (tracing the history of the legal fiction" and noting that its de-
velopment in the law of lunacy" permitted judges to be less protective of the property and
bodies of incompetents without changing the underlying laws which so fiercely protected
the property and bodies of competent individuals).
23 See infra notes 327-43 and accompanying text.
24 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344-45. See generally Strunk 445 S.W.2d at 145; In re Doe,
481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y App. Div. 1984) (per curiam).
22 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344-45. See generally Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145; Doe, 481
N.Y.S.2d 932.
" See McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91; infra notes 197-213 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 236-73 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 233-69 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 253-69 and accompanying text. See generally Dolgin, supra note 13 (ar-
guing that children suffer from the loss of childhood when shouldered with the burdens
and privileges of adulthood).
Cf. Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 150 (noting that prisoners are not permitted to
donate organs because of the potential for coercion and abuse). See generally Carl H. Fell-
ner & John R. Marshall, Kidney Donors—The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 Aid. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1245 (1970).
21 See generally Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145; Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932; Little, 576 S.W.2d 493.
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vest an organ and actually discusses the recognition of a right to an-
other's organ.32
 Part II also examines the legal standards to which
courts explicitly turn when deciding the cases. Finally, Part III ana-
lyzes the cost-benefit analysis underlying the court decisions that have
authorized organ harvest petitions in light of the research presented
in Part I. Part III then discusses why the judicial standards are un-
workable and suggests legislative action as the way to ensure uniform
and proper outcomes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedures and Effects of Bone Marrow and Kidney Transplants
When faced with a child in need of an organ, parents and doctors
often look to siblings because they tend to be more suitable donors
than other family members or unrelated donors. 33
 Sometimes, des-
perate parents will even conceive additional children solely to provide
the older sibling with a donor.34
 As Part II will show, it is settled that a
court has no authority to compel a competent adult to donate an or-
gan. 35
 In contrast, courts adopt a posture deferential to the needs of
32 See Ferrell v. Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641, 646 (D.C. 1997), discussed infra notes 215-
31 and accompanying text. •
as There is a 25% chance that a sibling will be a bone marrow snatch. See Ferrell v. Ro-
senbaum, 691 A.2d 641, 652 (D.C. 1997). Bone marrow transplants are used to treat aplas-
tic anemia and some forms of leukemia and severe immunodeficiency diseases, although
the therapy may offer no long-term advantages over conventional chemotherapy for pa-
tients with leukemia. See BMT Review, supra note 2, at 299.11s 1984, approximately 450 bone
marrow transplants were performed on children. See Deane L. Wolcott et al., Psychological
Adjustment of Adult Bone Marrow Transplant Donors Whose Recipient Survives, 41 TRANSPLAN-
TATION 484, 484 (1986) [hereinafter BMT Donors]. In 1997, the number was up to 2000. See
Corinna Kaarela, After a Child Donates Bone Marrow to a Sibling, Self-Esteem Often Fares Worse
Than That of Non-Donor Brothers and Sisters, UCSF PRESS RELEASE, Aug. 8, 1997, (visited Jan.
9, 2000) Chttp://www.ucsf.edu/pressrel/pr0897/0808bone.hunl>.
34 See joHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 213-14 (1994) [hereinafter CHILDREN OF CHOICE]; Gina Kolata, Birth
to Save Sibling Spurs Ethics Debate, CHL TRIB., June 4, 1991, at Al; Marina Ayala: Bonded by
Bone Marrow, Two Sisters Live Happily Ever After, PEOPLE, Mar. 15-22, 1999, at '78. [hereinaf-
ter Marissa Ayala],
33 See McFall v. Shiny, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (1978); see also Head v. Colloton, 331
N.W.2d 870, 872-731 (Iowa 1983) (refusing to disclose the identity of a snatched donor who
refused to donate bone marrow, despite the petitioner's grave medical condition); In re
George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to open adoption records for
au individual in need of a bone marrow transplant). But see Huffman, supra note 17, at
414-15 (suggesting a "construct" by which plaintiffs who satisfy certain criteria may obtain
a court order and compel a reluctant donor to cooperate under threat of civil and crimi-
nal penalties).
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third parties when the organ source is not legally competent, and they
generally find authority to permit such harvests. 36 The emerging ra-
tionale among opinions authorizing harvests and commentators sup-
porting the practice is that organ harvests psychologically benefit the
volunteered donor. 37 These opinions argue that permitting the har-
vest ensures the child or mentally disabled individual's psychological
well-being by preventing the death of a sibling and by conferring on
him or her the benefits associated with altruistic acts. 38
Setting aside the question of whether speculative psychological
benefits constitute a sufficient justification for this sort of bodily intru-
sion, these rationales assume away several important questions which
this Note will attempt to answer:39 (1) Are different transplant proce-
dures sufficiently similar to warrant generalizing the experience of
one type of donor to another?; 4° (2) Is the child or mentally disabled
adult protected from psychological harm when his or her sibling sur-
vives?; 41 and (3)Can data regarding the experience of adults who vol-
unteer to donate an organ reliably predict the experience of the child
or mentally disabled adult who is volunteered? 42
1. Different Transplant Procedures Yield Different Results
There are two obvious differences between a bone marrow and a
kidney transplant: First, bone marrow regenerates while a kidney does
not; and second, whereas bone marrow is extracted through a thick
needle, making it seem analogous to the common experience of do-
nating blood, a kidney transplant requires major surgery. 43 These do
36 See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (regarding kidney
harvest from seven year-old twin); In m Doe. 981 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (N.1: App. Div. 1984)
(per curiam) (regarding bone marrow harvest from mentally retarded adult); Little v.
Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. App. 1979, writ denied) (regarding kidney harvest from
young girl with Down's Syndrome).
37 See Rachel M. Dufault, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Frame-
work in Light of CurrrAn v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REV. 211, 230 (1991); Robbennolt. supra note
10, at 214.
38 See Dufault, supra note 37. at 230; Robbennolt, supra note 10. at 214.
" See generally Baron, supra note 8; Robertson, supra note 14.
40 See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
43 See BMT Review, supra note 2, at 300. After undergoing tissue typing. a bone marrow
harvest must be done under general anesthesia so the marrow can be extracted via multi-
ple punctures in the pelvic area with a rigid needle screwed through the bone. See id. It
takes approximately half an hour and upwards of 200 taps to extract one liter of bone mar-
row fluid from an adult; the procedure must be repeated at various intervals to extract
sufficient bone marrow fluid from a child. See Baron, supra note 8, at 163 n.20; Diane M.
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not, however, constitute the only differences between the two types of
transplants.'" The other perhaps more significant differences have less
to do with the manner in which the organ is harvested and more to
do with the underlying disease which has created the need for the or-
gan in the first place.45
 These differences, in turn, materially affect
the experience of the donor.
The time frame in which a family must locate a suitable donor
and the post-transplant prognosis for the organ recipient, are two
such factors that differ dramatically depending on the nature of the
disease and that can seriously and adversely affect the donor. 46 In
terms of the timing of the transplant, options short of a kidney trans-
plant from a living related donor exist for most people in need of a
kidney.47
 Dialysis, for example, can sustain an individual with no func-
tioning kidney for upwards of twenty-five years, depending on the na-
ture and severity of the underlying disease.48 Organs from cadavers
have become more available as awareness about the great need for
organs and comfort with the idea of donating has grown. 49 Emotion-
Gianelli, Bearing a Donor? Ethical Concerns Raised Over Having Baby for Marrow Match, Ass.
MED. News 3, available in 1990 WL 3259464. Although the greatest physical risk is from the
anesthesia, infection is also a concern. See Gianelli, supra; Celia Hall, Donor's Operation Car-
ries Little Risk, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 19, 1997, at 3.
Renal transplants are significantly more invoked. Donors tend to experience a
great deal of pain and discoinfort post-u -ansplant and there is a 28.2% risk of complica-
tions, ranging from mild infections and lung problems to extreme cases in which the do-
nor contracts the same illness which afflicted the recipient. See GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16,
at 166. Major complications include damage to the spleen or adrenal glands, major bleed-
ing and pulmonary embolisms. See Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 147. In addition, both
donors and recipients have a permanent scar running from mid-abdomen to mid-back. See
GrFr OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 166.
41
 See BATT Donors, supra note 33, at 484-85, 487.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., Richard L. Faber, Twenty.Five lems on Dialysis, in THE KIDNEY PATIENT
HANDBOOK ch. 6-b, (Richard L. Faber & Stephen W. Wilde eds., 4th ed. 1993) available at
clittp://wvirmultranet.com/—ktda/>. Faber's essay, begun in 1972, recounts his twenty-
five year experience with dialysis treatment, his return to normal functioning and the on-
going health problems caused by his underlying kidney disease. See generally id.
43 See id.
49
 Between 1990 and 1995 the number of cadaveric kidneys available in the United
States rose from 9878 to 11,818, a small but not insignificant increase. See Laura G. Dooley
& Robert S. Gaston, Stumbling Toward Equity: The Role of Government in Kidney 7} -ansplanta-
tion, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 703, 721 11.98. But see Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 142-43
(noting that the low rate of increase in the number of available cadaveric kidneys can
likely be traced to a decrease in the number of automobile fatalities and an increase in
diseases such as HIV that preclude transplantation). Authors Kallich & Merz conclude that
the pressures on living donors will increase as the supply of cadaveric organs becomes
insufficient to meet the demand. See id.
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ally related donors, such as spouses and friends, are also becoming
more acceptable sources of kidneys." Until recently, doctors were re-
luctant to mine this particular source of organs because of compatibil-
ity concerns; however, developments in immunosuppressive pharmal
cology have reduced the need for the type of close genetic match that
was formerly thought necessary. 5' These options materially affect the
experience of the donor by reducing the pressure a family may feel to
come up with an immediate donor, and by easing the psychological
pressure on the individual family member that he or she is the pa-
tient's only hope. 52
A bone marrow transplant, on the other hand, may be the pa-
tient's best hope for survival." Furthermore, the window of opportu-
nity for performing a bone marrow transplant is generally quite
oSee Jeff Punch, Spouses as Kidney Donor's: Recent Findings and Statistics, (visited Jan. 9,
2000) <littp://www.transweb.org/qa/asktw/answers/answers9507/Spousalkiditeydonors .
html>. The life expectancy for recipients of kidneys frOnt emotionally related donors
closely approximates the life expectancy for recipients of patent or cadaver kidneys. See
51 See id. In particular, the introduction of the immunosuppressive Cyclosporine can be
credited with widening the set of kidney donors. See id.; & Merz, supra note II. at
140-41. But see Hart, 289 A.2d at 389 (listing the serious and permanent side-effects associ-
ated with immunosupressives).
52 BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 484-85. This is not to suggest that these options are
optimal. Dialysis is a demanding treatment and patients often find the treatment and its
strict regimen of food, medication and exercise physically and emotionally draining. See
generally PSYCHONEPHROLOGY PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN HEMODIALYSIS AND TRANS-
PLANTATION (Noonan B. Levy ed., 1981) [heninafierPsYciforrEntakoLoGY].
55 See BMT Review, supra note 2, at 299. The efficacy of the treatment depends on the
underlying disease. See id. While a bone marrow transplant may be the optimal treatment
for some individuals with aplastic anemia, leukemia patients may fare no better from a
bone Marrow transplant than from the regular course of chemotherapy. See id. Advances in
medical science may eventually provide alternatives to current practices. For example.
transplants between individuals who are not closely matched may become more feasible.
umbilical cord blood may provide a source of bone marrow. and cloning whole organs may
become possible. See. e.g., Andrew Skolnick, Application Considered for Immunotoxin in Drat-
?tient of Graft-vs-Host Disease, 265 JAMA 2041, 2042 (1991) (stating that new drug shows
promise in reducing graft-versus-host disease (GVHD) for patients receiving bone marrow
transplants from their parents); Richard Saltus, Report Offers Vision of Versatile Fix-it Cell,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1998, at AS (reporting that scientists isolate human cells with the
potential to develop into any kind of cell in the human body, and that "stem cells," which
are only present "in the first few days of embryonic life," can reproduce in a petri dish).
Autologous transplants, the removal (prior to chemotherapy) and subsequent reinfusion
(after chemotherapy) of the patient's own bone marrow are being used for certain types of
cancers, but other types continue to require allogenic transplants, that is. bone marrow
from a donor. See Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979, 981, 987 (9th Cir.. 1992) (rejecting
claim that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the state
Medicaid system was required to fund both allogenic and autologous bone marrow trans-
plants).
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small.54
 The urgency of the situation makes it more likely that a bone
marrow donor, unlike a kidney donor, will feel that the life or death of
the ill family member is in his or her hands. 55 For children and men-
tally disabled adults, the urgency has the added effect of encouraging
hasty court proceedings with little adversarial content. 56 Moreover, a
failed bone marrow transplant exacts a higher price than a failed kid-
ney transplant because death from the complications associated with a
bone marrow transplant tends to be more agonizing than death from
the underlying disease.57
 The fact that kidney and bone marrow
transplants may yield vastly different results is a critical difference be-
tween the two types of transplants because, as discussed in the next
section, the psychological well-being of the donor is often tightly
bound to the ongoing health and well-being of the recipient."
2. The Potential for Psychological Harm from Donating an Organ
Courts that have authorized organ harvests have assumed a cause
and effect relationship between a transplant and the prevention of
psychological harm. 59
 In other words, courts assume that permitting
the transplant will ensure the survival of the sibling, which in turn will
" See Baron, supra note 8, at 182 (noting that the urgency of the situation results in the
adult donor being pressured to make an immediate decision while for the incompetent
donor, the situation results in a rushed legal proceeding in which the donor's interests go
unprotected). But cf. Doe, 481 N.Y5.2d at 932-33 (granting petition to harvest bone mar-
row from severely retarded adult notwithstanding the fact that the life of the ill sibling, also
au adult, was not in immediate jeopardy).
53
 See BMTDonors, supra note 33, at 484-85.
56 See Baron, supra note 8, at 181-88. Professor Baron notes that many guardians ad li-
tem assigned by Massachusetts courts to represent the volunteered donors were actually
doctors who worked for the hOspitals at which the transplants were to be performed. See id.
at 184. In addition to concerns about conflicts of interest, doctors may be better equipped
to be information resources than vigorous advocates for the interests of young or incom-
petent donors. See id.
57 See id. at 163 n.19; Deane L. Wolcott et al., Adaptation of Adult Bone Marrow Ransplant
Recipient Long-Term Survivors, 41 TRANSPLANTATION 478, 484-85 (1986) [hereinafter BMT
Recipients]; see also Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Del. 1990) (upholding
parents' right to refuse aggressive cancer treatment for their young son). In Newmark, the
court found that the treatment was "the most aggressive form of cancer therapy short of a
bone marrow transplant." Id. at 1118. If the treatment itself did not kill the boy, it would
offer him a forty-percent chance of survival, measured not in terms of cure, but in terms of
living for two additional years, cancer free. See id. at 1119 n.12.
58
 See generally BMTDonors, supra note 33.
" See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 389; Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499; cf.
Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1343-44 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to authorize a bone mar-
row transplant where the sibling relationship was too tenuous to support a finding of psy-
chological benefit).
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protect the child or mentally disabled donor from psychological
harm, or alternatively, will provide the donor with a psychological
benefit." Undoubtedly, some transplants do achieve their purposes
with no measurable ill effects on the donor. 61 Research indicates,
however, that this best outcome may be far less common than people
realize."
Transplant operations often create a unique link between the
donor of an organ and its recipient." Sometimes, this link opens the
door to greater closeness and a sense of mutual support." The link,
however, also tends to bind the pair in such a way that the donor's
psychological well-being and the quality of the donor-recipient rela-
tionship becomes dependent on the recipient's health and well-
being.65 One team of researchers at the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA) studied these. various effects." In one study, the
UCLA researchers found a high, direct correlation between a recipi-
ent's perception of his or her health, social functioning and overall
well-being and the donor's perception of their relationship." They
suggested that "physical or psychosocial deterioration in [bone mar-
row transplant] recipients may result in significant psychological dis-
tress in the donor. "68
Unfortunately, significant physical or psychosocial "deterioration"
is common among bone marrow recipients because bone marrow
transplants involve a high risk of severe, short-term illness and an of-
w See Hart, 289 A.2d at 389; Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499; cf. Cur-
ran, 566 N.E.2d at 1343-44.
61 See BMT Donors, 'supra note 33, at 487.
62 See id. at 485. Wolcott et al. noted that little attention has been paid to the long-term
psychological adjustment of bone marrow donors because, overall, kidney donors seem to
adjust quite well. In other words, researchers have wrongly assumed that the experience of
one set of donors can accurately predict the experience of another set of donors. See id. at
484; BMT Recipients, supra note 57, at 478.
62 Sce BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487. See generally Roberta Simmons, Psychological Re-
actions to Gift Giving, in PsvcnoNEPHRoLoGY, supra note 52, at 227.
64
 See Marissa Ayala, supra note 34, at 78.
65 See BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487; Si11111101LS, supra note 63, at 234.
66 See generally BMT Donors, supra note 33; BMT Recipients, supra note 57; BMT Review,
supra note 2.
67 See BM7' Donors, supra note 33, at 487. In addition, the passage of time post-
transplant did not diminish the correlation between the recipient's wellness and the do-
nor-recipient relationship. Sec id. A sister who donated a kidney to her brother reported
that he had been avoiding her for three months following the operation. 1 was never so
crushed. I would call him up and he would be as cold as ice. I was destroyed. To this day I
don't mention the kidney in front of him. ... He has never come out and said 'Thank
you.'" Simmons, supra note 63, at 234.
68 BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487.
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ten low rate of long-term survival. 69
 The statistics are grim: the one-
year survival rate averages only fifty to sixty percent, and among those
recipients who survive, approximately twenty-five percent experience
significant health problems." For many recipients, significant health
problems manifest in the form of Graft Versus Host Disease (GVHD),
a disease caused by the transplant itself.n Bone marrow produces
white blood cells; white cells form the core of our immune system. An
essential result of a bone marrow transplant, therefore, is that the
immune system of the donor is transplanted into the recipient: 72
[J] ust as a host's immune, system will [treat] a transplanted
liver or heart as foreign tissue and react against it, a trans-
planted immune system will [treat the] host's entire body as
foreign tissue antireact against it.... [A]cute GVHD mani-
fests itself in one of three ways: a skin rash that can progress
to blistering and ulceration, liver damage that can progress
to liver failure, and damage to the intestinal lining that can
lead to massive gastrointestinal bleeding. Chronic GVHD,
which ... can either follow an episode of acute GVHD or
arise spontaneously, has symptoms that resemble those of
autoimmune diseases like lupus and scleroderma, including
severe rashes, thickening and scarring of the skin, and limi-
tation of joint motion."
GVHD is the single greatest threat to a bone marrow recipient's
health following a transplant. 74
 In addition to the medical complica-
tions caused by GVHD, the drugs used to treat GVHD are strongly
associated with a wide spectrum of psychiatric and physical syn-
dromes, including renal failure, delirium, anorexia, chronic sleep
69 See id.; see also R. v. Cambridge Health Auth., 2 All E.R. 129, 133-35 (CA. 1995) (up-
holding the Health Authority's refusal to fund a second bone marrow transplant where the
treatment would only yield a 10% chance of survival if the treatment itself did not kill
her); BMT Recipients, supra note 57, at 478, 480, 482.
70
 See BZt1T Recipients, supra note 57, at 478. Statistics can, of course, mean different
things to different people, numbers which give a donor pause might well give a recipient
hope. But lest the reader lose sight, the question is not whether a recipient may benefit
from the transplant but whether the benefits courts impute to organ donors are likely to
be realized.
71 See Ronald Mlle, New Marrow for Old, MIT ALumm TECH. REV., No 1993, at 43.
72 See id.
" Id.
74 See id.
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disorders and gonadal dysfunction." Furthermore, even patients who
suffer from no GVHD complications have shown neurological dam-
age from the regular course of cancer treatment alone." Although
researchers continue to search for a way to prevent GVHD, one re-
searcher noted that while GVHD often kills its victims, those who sur-
vive the most severe bouts of the syndrome seem to have a greater
chance of long-term survival. 77
To date, only one study has focused particularly on the experi-
ence of minors from whom bone marrow was harvested for the
benefit of a sibling." Researchers at the University of California, San
Francisco found that fully one-third of children whose siblings were
bone marrow recipients suffered from signs of post traumatic stress
syndrome, even if the transplant had taken place years earlier." The
children were depressed, complained of recurrent nightmares, had
overdeveloped fears of hospitals and needles and had a constant sense
of dread that the experience might be repeated. 8° This was true for
both siblings who donated and siblings who did not donate. 81 The sib-
76 See BMT Review, supra note 2, at 305-06. Post-bone marrow transplant delirium led,
in at least one reported case, to stupor and coma. See id.
76 See id. at 305. Severe cognitive impairment and altered interpersonal behavior were
observed in a small percentage of patients at the UCLA clinic where the transplants and
subsequent studies were performed. See id.
77 See generally Kline, supra note 71.
76 See Kaarela, supra note 33.
7° See id.; Philip Cohen, Donor's Dread: 117iy do Children Who Help a Sick Sibling End Up De-
pressed?, 155 NEW SctrarrtsT 20, 20 (1997).
8° See Cohen, supra note 79, at 20; Kaarela, supra note 33.
sr Ste Cohen, supra note 79, at 20; Kaarela. supra note 33. It should not come as a sur-
prise that all of the siblings showed signs of trauma, regardless of whether they were se-
lected to donate. Proponents of organ harvests from minors might use this fact to argue
that because the whole family unit is traumatized by the illness visited on one of its mem-
bers, the situation for the young donor is not made worse by his participation in the organ
harvest. The UCSF study did not, however, control for the accumulated effects of the non-
donors being eliminated from the harvesting procedure. It is very possible. therefore, that
the trauma non-donors experience is as much a result of the donor selection process as it
is a result of the illness itself. For example, the non-donor's trauma might be a conse-
quence of the child's fear and worry of possibly being chosen and the guilt that attends his
feelings of relief for having escaped selection. Additionally, the child may experience
conflicted feelings of jealousy regarding the attention and praise the donor sibling receives
and confusion about how to understand all of these feelings in the face of his sister or
brother's struggle to live. See, e.g., Roger Dobson, Your Sister Could Save Your Life. Luckily She
Wants To, INDEF. (LONDON), May 14, 1996, at 6.
Furthermore, the study may support an argument that the emotional cost of ex-
traordinary medical treatments on individual family members and the family unit as a
whole may, in some cases, outweigh the remote chance of a cure for the ill child. See gener-
ally George Howe Colt & Eugene Richards, The American Family: Part Five; Mien a Child is
Sick, LIFE, Aug. 1991, at 58 (reporting one family's experience with childhood leukemia
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rings who donated, however, were more withdrawn, anxious, de-
pressed and had a lower sense of self-esteem, which the researchers
attributed to a guilty, fear that their tissue might not be "good
enough."82
 Other researchers have similarly warned that if the child
turns out to be an incompatible donor or the transplant is unsuccess-
ful, It] he ... guilt which may follow in the wake of [that] failure
could be transferred to the donor child with untoward effects, either
in early bonding or later, as the child grows up under the shadow of
having failed in an important task."83
 Moreover, negative reactions to
these procedures are not restricted to young donors. Despite the fact
that a bone marrow harvest is less complicated surgically, the percent-
age of adult bone marrow and kidney donors reporting negative reac-
tions to the donation experience was roughly the same.84 Nor are
difficulties in the ongoing relationships between donors and recipi-
ents limited to those cases in which the recipient fared poorly or
died.85
 Contrary to the expectation that a good medical result for the
recipient will lead to a good psychological result for the donor and
the relationship, some donor-recipient pairs become estranged even
when the recipient is a long-term disease-free survivor." This finding
led the UCLA researchers to express concern that the approximately
ten to twenty percent of the adult donors in one study who exhibited
adverse psychological consequences was only the "tip of the iceberg,"
because those donor-recipient pairs who had become estranged de-
clined to participate in the study at al1. 87 Lastly, they cautioned that
donors as a class may show a "relatively high incidence of pathological
grief reactions" if their recipients do not survive."
and noting that the healthy sibling was withdrawn, angry and resentful, the father devel-
oped heart problems as a result of the stress and the mother, who worked two and some-
times three jobs to support the family, came home each night ragged and worn out).
82 See Cohen, supra note 79, at 20.
83 Warren Kearney & Arthur L. Caplan, Parity for the Donation of Bone Marrow: Ethical
and Policy Considerations, in 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL POLICY: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
262, 275 (Robert H. Blank & Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds., 1992).
84 See Giri. OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 154, 169; Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 148
11.30.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487.
86 See BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487; see also Gist or LIFE, supra note 16, at 171-75.
One author has noted that "Nile donor who demonstrates clear ambivalence prior to
donation is likely to find the recipient reacting with hostility rather than gratitude for the
gift. The reluctant gift may be accepted, but the donor loses more than the gift in the ex-
change." GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 175.
87 See BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487.
" See id. at 488.
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Kidney transplants similarly bind the fate and well-being of do-
nors and recipients. While short-term health and long-term survival
for the kidney recipient are decidedly better than for the bone mar-
row recipient, kidney recipients have exhibited disturbing psychologi-
cal effects as a result of the transplant, and this in turn affects the do-
nor and the donor-recipient relationship." The psychological effects
observed in kidney recipients include delusions that the transplant
will lead to a full and complete recovery and a refusal to acknowledge
the true risks involved. In addition, recipients may become depressed
or suffer from the psychotic belief that they have taken on the quali-
ties of the donor through the transplanted organ." More commonly,
kidney recipients manifest a chronic fear and worry that they are liv-
ing on stolen time." Finally, recipients of kidneys . donated by relatives
have reported that they suffer from guilt and a sense of having an un-
payable debt hanging over their beads, an emotional residue that is
uncommon for individuals who receive kidneys from cadavers. 92
For the kidney donor, the physical toll of the harvesting proce-
dure is much greater than that exacted on the bone marrow donor
from the bone marrow extraction procedure. A kidney harvest in-
volves major surgery and results in the permanent loss of an organ as
well as a scar running from mid-back to mid-abdomen." Moreover,
because the rejection rate for even closely matched kidneys can run as
high as twenty percent, kidney donors may experience not only a
sympathetic or guilt reaction, but may feel that they underwent major
surgery and gave up a kidney for nothing. 94
89 See generally PSYCHONEPHROLOGY, supra note 52.
99 See Pietro Castelnuovo-Tedesco, Dansplantation: Psychological Implications of Changes in
Body Image, in PSYCHONEPHROLOGY, supra note 52, at 219, 222; Jorge Steinberg et al., Psy-
chological Factors Affecting Acceptance or Rejection of Kidney Transplants, in PSYCHONEPHROL-
OGY, supra note 52, at 185, 189.
91 See CasteInuovo-Tedesco, supra note 90, at 220-21. One researcher hypothesized that
these psychological effects were peculiar to treatments which effectively extend rather than
save a patient's life. See id. In other words, individuals who are treated by having diseased
tissue or organ surgically removed are more likely to see their treatment as reclaiming
their proper life span than are those whose treatment involves the receipt of another's
tissue or organ. That no psychosis or delusions were reported among recipients of life-
saving treatments is evidence for the researcher's hypothesis. See id.
92 See id.; GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 171-72.
93 See GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 166.
94 See id. at 169. In one study, the rejection rate for kidneys was 18% and a number of
donors exhibited or reported having severe negative reactions to the news. See id. One
brother who donated reported becoming hysterical when he found out that his kidney had
been rejected, exclaiming: "What a waste for use and what a horrible thing for him," Id.
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The physical and psychological differences between bone
marrow and kidney transplants make it difficult to speak of organ
transplants as an undistinguished class of procedures 95 Differences in
the underlying diseases and in the transplant procedures . lead to
different stresses and different types of risks. Similarly, the methods by
which individuals become donors vary to such a degree that to speak
of organ donors as an undistinguished class of individuals is
misleading.96 Just as the bone marrow donor may be more likely to
experience psychological trauma than the kidney donor, the donor
who is volunteered may be more likely to experience psychological or
physical trauma than the donor who steps forward as a mature and
competent volunteer. 97
B. The Volunteer vs. the Volunteered
Adults become live donors when they register with organ' pro-
curement organizations or agree to donate in response to a family
member's acute need.° The context in which an adult donates and
the factors leading to the decision to donate vary. In turn, context
and motivating factors may determine the donor's experience of the
donation itself.° The set of adult organ donors can therefore be bro-
ken down into three distinct groups: (1.) the altruistic, anonymous
adult donor; (2) the family member who decides to donate in re-
sponse to internal pressures; and (3) the family member who decides
to donate in response to external pressures.m Because minors and
mentally disabled adults cannot volunteer but must be volunteered by
parents or guardians, they make up a fourth, closed class of com-
pelled donors. 1°1
95
 See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
67
 See infra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
66 See generally Mark F. Anderson, Encouraging Bone Marrow Ransplants From Unrelated
Donors: Some Proposed Solutions to a Pressing Social Problem, 54 U. Pm. L. REV. 477 (1993);
Kallich & Merz, supra note 11.
" See GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 165; Anderson, supra note 98, at 530 (noting that
the donor who is 'forced to undergo an operation that exposes her to a small but
significant health risk as well as physical discomfort for several days ... will likely suffer
serious psychological trauma...").
im See Girr OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 233-71; Anderson, supra note 98, at 487-88; Fell-
ner & Marshall, supra note 30, at 1250.
101 See generally Robert W. Griner, Note & Comment, Live Organ Donations Between Sib-
lings and the Best Interest Standard, 10 GA. Sr. U. L. REV. 589,602-08 (1994).
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Adults who decide to participate in organ procurement organiza-
tions do so voluntarily out of a sense of charity and social duty."
These donors generally remain anonymous, as do the identities of the
recipients." Much has been written about the satisfaction and
heightened self-esteem these donors experience when they learn that
their organ or tissue may have given someone a fighting chance to
survive." It may be, however, that it is the anonymity and voluntari-
ness peculiar to this type of organ donation that permits the donor to
experience the euphoria of having done something utterly selfless
and good."
Family members who decide to donate organs when illness strikes
close to home fall into two primary groups: those who donate in re-
sponse to a sense of moral obligation and those who donate in re-
sponse to pressure from families or medical personnel." Generally,
102 See Anderson, supra note 98, at 529. Additionally, an individual's willingness to do-
nate at all may depend on the voluntariness of the donation process. Charitable organiza-
tions that attempt to coerce participation by pressuring volunteers or making them feel
guilty, for example, are likely to see a reduction in their contributions. See Alan Radley &
Marie Kennedy, Charitable Giving by Individuals: A Study of Attitudes and Practices, 48 Hum
REL. 685 (1995) (noting that when people experience charitable solicitations as intrusive,
refusing to give becomes an exercise of one's rights as a private citizen" rather than a
"breach of a social norm").
103 See Head, 331 N.W.2d at 872 (refusing to disclose identity of a potential bone mar-
row donor in a hospital donor registry to an individual suffering from leukemia). Al-
though participants in bone marrow registries remain anonymous, if their bone marrow is
used and the recipient survives the first year post-transplant, the donor and recipient's
identities may be disclosed with both parties' consent. In some cases, a lasting relationship
may develop between the formerly anonymous donor and the recipient of the tissue. The
author of this Note had the opportunity to speak with one such donor about his experi-
ence. Mr. Nicholas Fconomou participated in a local bone marrow registry near his home
in Virginia. His bone marrow ultimately went to a five year-old girl, Carly Scherer of Buf-
falo, New York, who was suffering front a rare form of leukemia. The transplant was per-
formed in June 1995, Mr. Economou and Carly met in June 1996. Though separated by
thousands of miles, the two families have since become very close. Carly will be declared
cured in May 2000, an event in which both families will share. See Telephone Interviews
with Nicholas Economou, November 1999-January 2000; see also Louise Continelli, Girl
Earns Place Among rating Cancer Survivors, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 9,2000, at 5B.
1°4 See Officer Is One in a Million, HERALD (GLASGOW), Sept. 17 1998, at 12 (recounting
the experience of a Scottish police officer whose participation in the UK bone marrow
registry led to him becoming a donor). One donor has noted: "What could be more
worthwhile than offering somebody the chance of life—it really is an amazing feeling." Id.
1°5 See id. Moreover; the fact that such stories receive this type of media attention and
public conunendation indicates that these acts of altruism are considered acts of heroism.
I°11 See GIFT of LIFE, supra note 16, at 233-50; Simmons, supra note 63, at 230. Family
members who, donate also make up a third, middle group. This group arrives at the deci-
sion to donate after more deliberation than those who feel morally obligated. See GIFT OF
LIFE, supra note 16, at 254-58. At the same time, for these donors family pressure plays an
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when adults decide to donate in response to a sense of moral obliga-
tion—that is, on the basis of an internal motivation—they experience
their participation as voluntary and generally feel good - about their
decision in both the short-term and the long-ten-n. 107 While the ill
family member's need for the organ triggers the donor's feeling of
moral .obligation, the donation itself is driven by the need to satisfy
the feeling of obligation.'" The donor's participation does not, ulti-
mately, depend on the outcome of the transplant nor the risks in-
volved. 109 A clear and developed sense of one's moral obligation,
therefore, seems to reduce the likelihood that a donor will be ambiva-
lent about giving up the organ, and may in turn immunize him from
the psychological after-effects noted above.'"
The second group of family members decide to donate in re-
sponse to pressure from family or from medical personne1. 111 This
pressure can range from subtle situational pressures, to messages as
blatant as: "if you don't donate, s/he will die." 112 Whereas moral obli-
gation can properly be called an internal motivation, these pressures
are external and can be quite intense.'" More than half of the kidney
identifiable, albeit a less coercive and corrosive, role. See id. at 257-58. For purposes of this
analysis, the more extreme types of decision-making capture the key components of the
more mediated decision-making process.
107 See GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 165, 285.
"8 See id. at 238, 239-50.
"8 See id.
no See id. at 165.
m See Kallich Merz, supra note 11, at 144 (pressure from medical personnel); Carr
OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 154-65 (family pressure).
112 See Girr of LIFE, supra note 16, at 165 (noting that 12% of the case studies involved
"blatant unwelcome types of family pressure").
us See generally, e.g., Lawse v. University of Iowa Hosps., 434 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1988). In one case, a living kidney donor brought an action against the hospital and
doctors for wrongful removal of his kidney. See id. at 896. Thirteen years after he donated a
kidney to his brother, the donor's remaining kidney failed. See id. at 898. The donor
claimed that because the hospital and staff had negligently failed to respond to his unwill-
ingness to donate, his consent had been coerced. See id. The donor specifically alleged that
the doctor and hospital had coerced him by giving him misinformation or insufficient
information: (1) despite the fact that his brother was doing well on dialysis, he had been
told that his brother would die without his kidney; (2) he was counseled that "there was
basically no risk to hhn, it was like having an appendix removed" and (3) information
about his tissue typing had been shared with other family members before he had been
informed of the results—information that could not help but affect those members' will-
ingness to donate. At the same time, information about another brother's refusal to do-
nate was kept from him. See id. at 897. The court frankly discussed the coercive effect of
fandly pressure and aired the concern that as a result, related donors nmy never be able to
give a truly informed consent. See id. The case was dismissed, however, because the statute
of limitations had run out. See id. at 898.
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donors in one study group were subject to pressure that researchers
felt had a "compulsory quality. "114 Even when the pressure is not
overt, the threat of family sanctions may be coercive to the point
where family members feel that they truly have no choice. 115 The face
of death, however, only rarely changes existing and entrenched family
dynatnics. 118 A hard but undeniable truth is that family members may
not be loved or valued equally. 117 Sibling rivalry, favoritism and other
pre-illness conflicts affect the way families manage the stress of the
illness, as well as the process by which donors may be selected. 118
Moreover, these factors color the long term experience of the donor
and may even affect the medical success of the transplant. 119
114 See GIFT of LIFE, supra note 16, at 160-61. Fifty-four percent of the donors in the
study group were subject to such "cOnipulsory" pressures. See id. at 161.
115 See Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 144-46. One author has noted: The social
mores of the family [may] dictate that all members ... offer to donate their organs....
Violating this norm entails substantial and likely penalties that few would endure willingly,
such as excommunication from the entire family unit." Id. at 146. One mother spoke about
the pressure on her ten-year-old daughter to donate:
In a way, I suppose, she didn't really' have a choice. We simply told her the
facts. We didn't say, "Look if you don't do it, Lewis will die," because that
Would have been too much, but she knew as much. At the end of the day a
parent isn't going to say, "The choice is yours. If you decide not to, that's fine,
we'll just prepare for our son's funeral." If she had had very strong views
against being a donor, I don't know what we would have done.
Dobson, supra note 81. In fact, the ten year-old daughter had hoped she would not turn
out to be a match and spoke of her fear of hospitals and needles. See id. None of this, how-
ever, amounted to the daughter holding "strong views" in the mother's eyes. See id.
116 See Baron, supra note 8, at 173; Fatter & Marshall, supra note 30, at 1248.
117 See BMT Donors, Supra note 33, at 487. "[O]ne mother remarked openly to [the
transplant team] 'Isn't it strange that it ends up our [son, the] black sheep ... is the
donor to our favorite [daughter].'" See id. This comment led to staff aptly to ask, "What will
these parents do to this donor son psychologically if she dies?" See id.
115 See id.; see also Baron, supra note 8, at 173 (noting the danger that parents will be
"particularly insensitive" to the harms a "disfavored donor" might suffer or "particularly
impressed" with the benefits a "favored recipient" might receive).
119 See Carr OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 445; see also Castehmovo-Tedesco, supra note 90,
at 222-23 (reporting the case of a boy who made a suicidal gesture, rejected the grafted
kidney and died after discovering that the kidney had been donated by his "ne'er do well"
father); Steinberg, supra note 90, at 189. Steinberg attempted to predict the acceptance or
rejection of transplanted , kidneys on psychological factors alone. See id. at 186-87. Of the
twenty-six recipients iu the study, only one was rated as "unlikely" to retain the trans-
planted kidney. See id: at 188-89. In that case, a forty-eight year-old atmt agreed to &mate a
kidney to her ill and estranged twenty-six year-old niece. See id. The family urged the aunt
to be the donor because of their belief that the operation would reunite the two women.
See id. Notwithstanding her aunt's willingness to donate, however, the niece maintained
her distance. See id, Thig reaction angered the aunt, and prompted the aunt to tell her
niece to "Make my fucking kidney... [,] I, don't want to see you again." Sec Steinberg,
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Notwithstanding the internal and external pressures on family
members to volunteer, adults may decide that for whatever reason,
they are unwilling to step forward. 12° Among the immediate family,
studies have found that adult siblings of ill family members are the
least willing to donate while parents and children are the most will-
ing. 121
 Nor is it uncommon for an adult family member to publicly
manifest a willingness to be a donor but, in the privacy of a medical
consultation, indicate by actions or words that he or she does not ac-
tually wish to donate. 122
 In response, medical personnel have been
known to manufacture medical excuses that provide unwilling donors
a graceful way out and that protect them from further family pres-
sure. 123
Minors and mentally disabled adults make up the final set of do-
nors, but rather than volunteering to donate, these donors are volun-
teered by a parent or guardian. 124
 The question for medical person-
nel, then, turns not on the child or mentally disabled adult's
willingness to donate, but on the parent or guardian's legal authority
to consent to the donation on behalf of the child or ward. 125 This is
the way that judges and courts most commonly become involved in
the process of obtaining organs from live donors.
supra note 90, at 189. As predicted, the aunt's kidney was rejected shortly after the trans-
plant. See id.
120 See Simmons, supra note 63, at 228 (forty-three percent of family members declined
to be tested for initial compatibility); see also Friedman Ross, supra note 16 (expressing the
concern that an organ exchange program which effectively eliminates the Incompatible
donor" excuse may be problematic for those donors who count on being able to express
their show of support for the family member without being under any obligation to do-
nate).
121 See Girr OF Lin, supra note 16, at 203-04. The percentages of family members who
donated or volunteered to donate were: parents (86%); adult children (66%); sisters
(48%) and brothers (46%). See id. at 203. Despite their relative unwillingness to donate,
most related organs come from siblings. See id. at 204.
122 See GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 289; Fenner & Marshall, supra note 30, at 1246;
Kallich & Merz, supra note 1 i ; at 152.
123 See GIFT OF LIFE, sup-a note 16, at 212, 289; Fenner & Marshall, supra note 30, at
1246. But see Ka & Merz, supra note 11, at 144-45 (noting that although most pressure
can be traced to the fannly, transplant teams sometimes become so invested in the survival
of a patient that they ignore a potential donor's worries or reluctance to donate).
124 See generally Hart, 289 A.2d 386; Little, 576 S.W.2d 493.
125 See Leonard H. Glantz; Law, Medicine and Socially Responsible Research, 24 AM. J.L. &
MED. 213, 220 (1998). See generally Hart, 289 A.2d 386; Little, 576 S.W.2d 493; Baron, supra
note 8.
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II. CASE LAW AND THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Uncertainty about a parent or guardian's right to consent to
medically unnecessary organ harvests from children and mentally dis-
abled adults has led doctors and hospitals to require court orders to
preempt any question of liability. 126 State courts are the current forum
for adjudicating such petitions.'" There are currently no statutes
authorizing or compelling organ harvests from compatible incompe-
tents. 128 In their absence, courts have historically applied the "best
interest" or "substituted judgment" standard.' Regardless of which
standard is applied, a cost-benefit analysis underlies most judicial rea-
soning, balancing the benevolent desire of the family to save the life
of an ill family member against the known physical risks and theoreti-
cal psychological benefits that might accrue to the organ donor.'"
A. The Standards and Analyses Courts Apply to Incompetent Donors
The judicial standards to which courts turn when faced with a
petition to harvest organs from legal incompetents have roots that
pre-date the organ procurement dilemma by hundreds of yea•s."'
The best interest standard, for example, can be traced back to the
126 See, e.g., Glantz, supra note 125, at 220-24; cf. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a fifteen-year-old's consent was invalid to authorize a physi-
cian to perform a skin graft on him for the benefit of his cousin, but indicating, in dicta,
that the parents' consent would likely have been sufficient). See generally Baron, supra note
8.
127
 See generally, e.g., Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); Little v. Little, 576
S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App. 1979, writ denied).
128 See Curran, supra note 9, at 892; Baron, supra note 8, at 177. Professor Baron noted
in his 1975 article that at that time there was one state statute that permitted 14-year-olds
to consent to donate organs, but that statute has since been repealed. See id. Currently, the
only statutes governing organ harvests involve post-mortem harvests. See, e.g., David A.
Jeffries, Note, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 631 (1998) (noting that all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia adopted the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and its 1987 revisions, designed to
encourage organ donation and provide guidelines for organ procurement efforts). At least
two commentators, however, have advocated some form of legislation which would man-
date either participation in donor registries or the actual donation. See generally Anderson,
supra note 98 (mandatory participation in bone marrow registries with voluntary dona-
tion); Huffman, supra note 17 (compulsory donation under threat of civil and criminal
penalties).
129 See, e.g., Hart V. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390-91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (applying sub-
stituted judgment standard to authorize a kidney transplant from a minor); In re Doe, 481
N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (per curiana) (applying best interest standard to
authorize a bone marrow harvest from a mentally retarded adult).
IN See Hart, 289 A.2d at 390-91; Doe, 481 NN,S.2d at 933.
171 See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 361.
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dramatic social, philosophical and economic shifts of the 18th and
19th centuries, which in turn led to changes in the way that children
were perceived and the way that childhood was understood. 152 Where
children were once treated as simply small adults, the view emerged
that children should be safeguarded from many of the ills of adult-
hood and an increasingly industrialized society.'" The best interest
standard developed as a way for the legal system to accommodate this
emerging view and today it remains the governing principle for adju-
dicating civil cases involving minors.'" Courts generally invoke this
standard under the parens patria power of the state-the state's respon-
sibility and authority to protect society's most vulnerable members. 135
The substituted judgment doctrine, on the other hand, was
originally applied in cases involving the property or estate of a now
incompetent but fortherly competent individual. 136 In its present
form, the standard requires that decisions be made not by substituting
a court or guardian's values, but rather in accordance with the values
or wishes the individual expressed while still competent." 7 Whereas
in See id. The evolution of a child-centered approach in custody disputes, for example,
can be traced from the early view that fathers had an absolute right to custody, to the pre-
sumption that the mother was the proper custodian, to the recent, more flexible, best
interest standard that permits a court of equity to consider the individual circumstances.
See Griffith, supra note 4, at 292.
153
 SeeDolgin, supra note 13, at 360-61.
154 See id. at 361. See generally Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1319 (holding that the best interest
standard was the proper one for evaluating petitions to harvest organs from minors and
mental incompetents).
155 See Griffith, supra note 4, at 305, 331; see also Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
156
 The substituted judgment doctrine can be traced back to the English case Ex parte
Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816) and the English law of lunacy. See Harmon, supra
note 22, at 19. The chancellor in that case was faced with the niece of a lunatic (someone
who had once been of sound mind and who 'night regain his sanity) who pleaded that she
needed a greater apportionment of her uncle's money. See id. at 20. Rather than try to gain
some insight into this particular lunatic's situation or his relationship with this particular
relative, the chancellor instead relied on what the objective, "reasonable lunatic" would
wish to do under the circumstances. See id. at 22. Because the 1,Vhithread decision was about
"remedylittgi an inconvenience ... that might result from the general rule of law" without
disturbing accepted and established allocations of rights and property, Harmon contends
that the substituted judgment doctrine constituted a legal fiction from its very inception.
See id. at 7, 22-23; Lynn E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompe-
tents and Misapplication of the Substituted Judgments Doctrine, 7 J.L. & Hraumt 107, 108 (1992-
93). The doctrine has been recognized in American courts since 1844, but only since
Strunk u Strunk has it been extended to medical decisions involving individuals who were
never of sound mind. See Harmon, supra note 22, at 32.
Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 336 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The expectation is that the substitute decisionmaker will have sufficient in-
formation or insight into the proclivities of the individual or situation to make a decision
which closely approximates the decision the individual would make for himself if he were
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the best interest standard might properly be described as paternalis-
tic, the substituted judgement standard, in theory, protects the indi-
vidual's right to make decisions for him or herself. 138 The doctrine has
since grown beyond its roots in property law to encompass non-
therapeutic medical decisions made on behalf of incompetents. 1"
Furthermore, the doctrine has been applied to individuals who were
never legally competent, a practice which exposes the values of the
true decisionmaker: the court or guardiansm
A survey of reported cases helps to establish the outer limits to
which courts will go to find authorization for an organ harvest and to
highlight the judicial reasoning that supports imposing a global pro-
hibition on harvests from minors and mentally disabled adults. 141
L Substituted Judgment Standard Applied
In 1969, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided Strunk v. Strunk,
the first reported organ transplant case. 142 Strunk expanded the scope
of the substituted judgment doctrine, holding that a mother's consent
was sufficient to authorize the removal of one of her mentally re-
tarded son's kidneys. 143 The recipient, Tommy, was twenty-eight years
old and suffering from a fatal kidney disease; the donor, Jerry, was
twenty-seven years old, with a mental age of six) ," Each member of
the family was tested for compatibility, but Jerry was the only potential
match. 145
 In order to reach its holding that the substituted judgement
able. See id. Griffith•argues that the usefulness of the standard diminishes as evidence of
past preferences becomes less reliable and that where the evidence is unreliable, the stan-
dard constitutes a legal fiction. See Griffith, supra note 4, at 303.
"a See Griffith, supra note 4, at 318-23.
159 See generally Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145; Robertson, supra note 14.
14° See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146; Harmon, supra note 22, at 34-35 (criticizing Strunk
for eliminating the protection the original standard provided to incompetent individuals).
See generally Lebit, supra note 136.
141 Many cases go unreported. For a sample of Massachusetts slip opinions authorizing
harvests, see Baron, supra note 8, at 161-62 int.15-16.
142 445 S.W.2d 145. Although Strunk was the first reported transpkuit case, there were a
substantial number of unreported cases dating back to 1957. See Barron. supra note 8, at
161-62 nn.15-16 (discussing twenty-two unreported cases out of the Massachusetts courts,
including the first petition brought before any court; in every case, courts of equity were
found to have the power to authorize organ transplants between minor siblings).
Strunk remains the most frequently cited organ transplant case and has sparked a
great deal of debate. Most commentators and courts have concluded that the Strunk court
• arrived at the proper decision but applied an improper standard.
145 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 149.
144 See id. at 145-46. Jerry was permanently institutionalized. See id. at 146.
146 See id.
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standard was the correct standard to apply, the Strunk court analo-
gized the transfer of an incompetent's organ to the transfer of an in-
competent's real or personal property.'" Strunk is widely recognized
as the first United States case to extend this doctrine beyond ques-
tions of property to medical decisions made on behalf of an incompe-
tent when the incompetent's own health was not threatened. Strunk
also extended the doctrine to situations involving individuals who had
no history of ever having been legally competent. 147
Strunk set the unfortunate precedent of invoking the substituted
judgment doctrine while relying on a determination that the trans-
plant was in the incompetent brother's best interest, a determination
that was framed in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.'" Finding that the
benefit (saving his brother) outweighed the cost (losing his kidney),
the court reasoned that the transplant was in Jerry's best interest, and
therefore, within the power of the court to authorize. 149 .
The Strunk dissent, however, noted that the extension of the sub-
stituted judgment doCirine to medically unnecessary procedures was
not only without precedent, but inconsistent with existing state case
law and contrary to the scope of existing state statutes. 150 Additionally,
although sympathetic to the terrible choices facing the family, the dis-
sent voiced the concern that taking a body part from one who could
not fully understand or consent brought to mind the types of human
experiments conducted during World War 11. 151
After Strunk, courts were divided regarding the proper scope and
application of the substituted judgment doctrine. 152 Some courts re-
jected Strunk's reasoning; others embraced and extended it. 155 In
1972, in Hart v. Brown, the Connecticut Superior Court followed in
Strunk's footsteps by holding that a court of equity had the power to
authorize a kidney transplant from a seven year-old to her twin sis-
146 See id. at 148.
147 See id. at 148; Harmon, supra note 22, at 34-35.
146 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148.
149 See id. at 150 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 149-50.
I" See id. at 149. The Strunk dissent stated: "(Tlo hold that committees, guardians or
courts have such awesome power [to remove a kidney from a mentally incompetent indi-
vidual for transplant purposes] even in the persuasive case before us, could establish legal
precedent, the dire result of which we cannot fathom. Regretfully I must say no." Id. at
151.
152 See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d 386; In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In
re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
165 See generally Hart, 289 A.2d 386; Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185; Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d
180.
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ter. 154 Hart similarly relied on the substituted judgment doctrine for
its equity powers, but engaged in a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether or not the transplant was in the child-donor's best inter-
ests. 155
Transplants between identical twins enjoy the greatest long-term
success, because the genetic similarities rechice the possibility that the
organ will be rejected.156 A transplant from any other individual re-
quires that the recipient be given immunosuppressive drugs to inhibit
the body's natural defenses. 157 Suppressing the immune system puts
the recipient at risk of infection and other diseases, and the drugs
themselves have well-documented short and long-term side effects. 158
The Hart decision turned almost exclusively on the severity of poten-
tial complications the recipient twin might endure if a kidney other
then her identical twin's were used. 159 The court went so far as to
characterize any outcome that would require resort to hnmunosup-
pressive drugs as "cruel and inhuman." As a "close, independent
and objective` investigation of [the parents'] motivation" indicated
that the decision was morally sound in the eyes .of the community, the
court held that permitting the parents to substitute their consent for
the consent of their minor child was the only just result. 161
2. The Best Interest of the Child Standard and the Interests of Third
Parties
A few years after Strunk was decided, two courts explicitly rejected
its extension of the substituted judgment doctrine to petitions involv-
ing organ harvests from individuals who have never been competent.
Instead, the courts applied the best interest standard. 162 Both the Lou-
164 289 A.2d 386.
166 Id. at 389-90.
156 See id. at 388.
157 See id. at 389.
155 See id. (stating: 'The side effects of the inununosuppressive drug ... are numerous
and include the possibility of bone marrow toxicity, liver damage. and a syndrome called
Cushing syndrome—a roundish face, a 'buffalo hump' on the back of the neck, and
growth retardation. Sonic less common side effects are a demineralization of the bone
mass which will result in the collapsing of bones of the spine; aseptic necrosis of the femo-
ral head of the hip, making a person unable to walk; peptic ulcer disease with bleeding;
hairiness; sexual immaturity; and cataracts of the eyes.").
159 See Hart, 289 A.2d at 389.
160 See id. at 391.
161 See id. at 389-90. The court recounted the testimony of the Hart family's clergyman
and the guardian ad litem who all agreed that the transplant should go forward. See id.
162 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; Peseinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
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isiana Court of Appeals, in In re Richardson, and the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, in In re Pescinski, denied the guardians' petitions to
authorize kidney harvests from incompetent siblings.'" These courts
reasoned that when a transplant is for the sole benefit of a third party,
it is, by definition, not in the best interest of the incompetent individ-
ual.'"
Pescinski and Richardson distinguished Strunk, noting that guardi-
anship laws in neither state could support the procedural or substan-
tive posture of that decision. 165
 Rather, the laws in both states empow-
ered guardians merely to protect the estate of an incompetent, not to
make independent decisions regarding the disposition or betterment
of the estate.'" The Pescinski and Richardson courts reasoned that such
unqualified protection of a property right could not be greater than
the protection of a minor or incompetent's "right to be free from
bodily intrusion."167 Richardson held that because the organ harvest
was for the sole benefit of the older sibling, the transplant was not in
the best interest of the retarded brother and therefore, the court de-
nied the petition.' 68
 The Pescinski court denied the petition on similar
grounds: holding that absent the consent of the incompetent individ-
ual, neither the court nor the guardian had the authority to consent
to an organ transplant that would benefit only a third party.'"
The Pescinski dissent sharply criticized the majority for its unwill-
ingness to adopt the substituted judgment doctrine.'" The dissenting
judge reasoned that where an individual is incompetent and unable
to speak for himself, it is appropriate for a court of equity to substitute
its own judgment and do for the incompetent what the court is cer-
tain the incompetent would do for himself if he were able.'" In the
163 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
164 In Richardson, the potential donor was a seventeen year-old retarded boy who had a
mental age of about three; the average life expectancy for his type of retardation was only
twenty-five years. The recipient was his thirty-two year-old sister. See Richardson, 284 So. 2d
at 186. In Pesrinski, the potential donor was a thirty-nine year-old catatonic schizophrenic.
The recipient was his thirty-eight year-old sister who had been on dialysis for five years. See
Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 180-81.
163 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; see also Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
166 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; see also Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
567 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; see also Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 183 11.1 (Day, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority analogized permitting the kidney harvest to giving
away the incompetent's property).
169 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187.
169 See Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 181, 182.
57° See id at 182 (Day, J., dissenting).
171 See id. at 184.
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dissent's view, the substituted judgment standard weighs the harms
and benefits that might accrue to both siblings from prohibiting or
permitting the transplant. 172 The dissent argued that in this case, pro-
hibiting the transplant harmed the incompetent brother because it
condemned him to be forever "a receiver, a taker, but never a
giver."175 The Pescinski and Richardson majorities, on the other hand,
refrained from balancing harms and benefits. 174 Rather, once the
courts found that no benefit would flow to the incompetent donors,
the courts' analysis was complete.
Courts that adopted Strunk's explicit substituted judgment rea-
soning, however, still adhered to its underlying best interests analysis.
In 1984, in In re Doe, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, affirmed the trial court's order authorizing a bone marrow
transplant from a forty-three year-old severely retarded adult to his
thirty-six year-old leukemic brother. 175 As the source of the court's
power to authorize the transplant was grounded in its parens patria
power, the court held that it could only authorize such a transplant if
it found the transplant to be in the incompetent's best interests." 6 In
determining the best interests of the incompetent donor, the trial
court did the same type of cost-benefit analysis that the Strunk court
used and that the Pescinski dissent advocated, finding that the possible
death of the leukemic brother outweighed the possible physiological
and psychological harm from the harvest itself. 177
In 1990, in Curran v. Bosze, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied
a petition to harvest bone marrow from minor twins, and in so doing,
dealt directly with the differences between the substituted judgment
and best interest standards. 175 The father brought a petition on behalf
of his twelve year-old son in order, to compel the mother of his three
year-old illegitimate twins to have them tested for compatibility. 179 The
175 See id. at 183.
175 See id. at 184. In holding that the court could only authorize action that would
benefit the incompetent financially or physically, the dissent argued, the incompetent "is
forever excluded from doing the decent thing, the charitable thing." Id.
174 See Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
175 See Doe, 481 N.YS.2d at 933. The appellate decision is no more than a page long,
with few facts and little analysis. The lower court's decision has been sealed, as are many
such decisions. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 8, at nn.15 & 16.
176 See Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33.
177 See id. at 933.
178 See 566 N.E.2d 1319; see also Lebit, supra note 136, at 108.
179 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321. Both trial and appellate courts denied the father's
request that the question of compelling compatibility testing be decided separately from
the question of compelling the transplant itself. See id. at 1345. The legal strategy behind
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facts showed that the twins' parents had never been married, the
twins' paternity was established by a blood test shortly after birth and
the siblings had met on only two occasions. 180
In its carefully drafted opinion, Curran rejected the use of the
substituted judgement doctrine in adjudicating petitions involving
minors and other individuals who had never been legally compe-
tent.181
 The.court reasoned that it is a competent adult's "philosophi-
cal, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of
life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness,
medical procedures, suffering and death" to which he or she looks to
make important decisions about submitting to or refusing medical
treatment. 182 Under Curran, where because of age or infirmity an in-
dividual has not developed a personal value system, application of the
substituted judgment doctrine "undermin[es] the foundation of self-
determination and inviolability of the person upon which the right to
refuse medical treatment stands" because the decisionmaker must
substitute his or her own values for those of the incompetent. 183 Cur-
ran held that the best interest standard was the proper one to apply in
these situations and outlined three factors that courts should consider
when determining whether a transplant is in the best interests of the
child or ward: (1) the parent must be informed of the risks and
benefits of the harvesting procedure; (2) the primary caretaker must
be prepared to provide the donor with the necessary emotional sup-
port and (3) the relationship between the donor and recipient must
be close. 1 a•
In determining the best interests of the young twins, Curran heav-
ily relied on testimony that the twins would suffer psychological harm,
the request is transparent: it would likely be more difficult for the mother or the court to
resist the transplant if the twins were discovered to be perfect matches. See generally Ander-
son, supra note 98. In a similar vein, Anderson proposes a mandatory bone marrow regis-
try with voluntary donation. See id. at 494-527. Leaving the actual donation to the discre-
tion of the individual in the event he or she turns out to be a match, Anderson argues,
would encourage donation without violating substantive due process or raising privacy
concerns. See id. at 527 n.139. Nevertheless, Anderson's scheme relies on people being
shamed or coerced into donating organs once the need for the bone marrow is particular-
ized via a tissue match. See id. at 526.
180 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1320, 1321. The blood test took place in the context of a
paternity suit filed by the mother against the father. See id. at 1320.
181 See id. at 1325-26; Lebit, supra note 136, at 108 (noting that "[dile father argued
that under the doctrine of substituted judgment, the children would agree to submit to the
procedure if they were old enough to make an informed, rational decision.").
182 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1323.
188 See id. at 1324 (quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989)).
184 See id. at 1325-26,1343.
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not from being compelled to donate bone marrow, but rather from
undergoing the harvest without the support of their mother.'" The
court also relied on psychiatric testimony tending to show that no
benefit could be attributed to the twins absent a close relationship
with their half-brother. 186 Applying the best interests test, the Curran
court found that both parents were well-informed about the risks and
benefits of the procedure, but questioned the mother's ability to pro-
vide the necessary emotional support because of her objections to the
transplant. 187 Furthermore, the court found that the relationship be-
tween the half-siblings went no deeper than their paternal blood
ties.'" Because two of the three factors were unsatisfied, the bone
marrow transplant was not in the twins' best interests, and therefore
the court denied the father's petition.'"
Whether courts follow Strunk's explicit application of the substi-
tuted judgment standard or its implicit search for the best interests of
the child or ward, petitions to authorize organ harvests from incom-
petents have been decided on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.'"
Some courts frame the equation exclusively in terms of harm to the
donor: will the possible loss of a sibling cause more psychological or
physical harm to the donor than the operation itself?"' Other courts
have framed the analysis in terms of the benefits that they and the
parents hope the incompetent will realize from his or her participa-
tion in the transplant. 192 Some courts seek to balance the relative
in See id. at 1335.
186 See id. at 1343-44.
187 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344.
1" See id. at 1344.
189 See id.
199 See Lebit, supra note 136, at 113. Professor Baron has noted that "Din effect, [the
parents] are given the authority to sacrifice the interests of the prospective donor if they
reasonably conclude that the costs to him are outweighed by the potential benefits to the
recipient." Baron, supra note 8, at 172.
191 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146; Doe, 481 N.YS.2d at 932. Both the Strunk and Doe
courts concluded that the psychological harm the incompetents might experience from
the death of their sibling outweighed the physical risks of the harvesting procedures. See
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146; Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
192 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1343-44. Curran held, for example, that in order to
authorize an organ harvest, a court must find that the donor will benefit psychologically
from the transplant and furthermore, that donors can only be expected to realize the psy-
chological benefit when the donor has an existing relationship with their sibling-recipient.
Sre id. Richardson, on the other hand, held that a court must find a more tangible benefit to
the donor before it can authorize the harvest. See 284 So. 2d at 187. The Richardson court
analogized an organ harvest to the transfer of property: if the transfer of the 'property' will
not benefit the owner, then a guardian does not have the authority to give that 'property'
away. See id.
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harms to which donors and recipients will be subjected, or alterna-
tively, the relative benefits donors and recipients will realize.'"
The benefits/harms approach is peculiar to petitions involving
minors and mentally disabled adults. Petitions to compel competent
adults to undergo medically unnecessary surgical procedures have
yielded results similar to the Richardson, Pescinski and Curran line of
cases, but the analysis has been markedly different. 194
B. The Standards and Analyses Courts Apply to Competent Donors
The detailed analyses courts use when deciding whether or not to
permit an organ harvest from a minor or incompetent adult stand in
striking contrast to the quick and sharply worded dismissal of a similar
claim brought against a competent adult.' 95 For example, in 1978, in
McFall v. Shimp, the Pennsylvania District and County court held that a
court of equity had no authority to compel a competent adult to sub-
mit to a bone marrow transplant.'" The plaintiff in McFall suffered
from a rare, and ultimately terminal, bone marrow disease. The de-
fendant, his cousin, had undergone compatibility tests, and although
he was a match, he declined to donate. 197 The court, in an opinion-
ated and brief decision, took both parties to task.'" Criticizing the
plaintiff for advocating such a blatant violation of an individual's right
to bodily integrity, the court warned, "[f] or a society which respects
the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein .. . of
one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is
revoking to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence."199 Notwith-
199 The Hart court and the Pescinski dissent are typical of this approach. See Hart, 289
A.2d at 389-90; Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (Day, J., dissenting). The Hart court weighed
the harms that the immunostippressive drugs would cause the ill twin if she were to receive
a kidney from anyone but her twin. See 289 A.2d at 389-90. The court also noted that be-
cause the twins were close, the donor-twin would benefit psychologically from participating
in the kidney transplant and, therefore, the Hart court approved the harvest. See id. at 389.
The Pescinski dissent similarly advocated a balancing of the donor and recipients' "relative
need" for the organ. See 226: N.W.2d at 182-83 (Day, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that the petition should have been granted because the ill sibling would die without a kid-
ney, whereas the mentally disabled brother would survive with only one kidney. See id.
194 cf. In re Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d 326,330 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to compel
a woman to undergo a cesarean section for the benefit of her nine-month old fetus). See
generally McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
199 See McFall., 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91-92.
196 See id. at 91.
07 See id. at 90.
198 See id. at 91-92.
08 Id. at 92 (emphasis in original).
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standing its desire to condemn the defendant's refusal on moral
grounds, the court concluded that under the law, a competent adult
could not be forced to submit to a medical procedure for the benefit
of a third party.20°
This unequivocal protection of a coMpetent individual's right to
bodily integrity despite the needs of a third party has been echoed in
the provocative context of the rights of a fetus as against the rights of
its mother."' In 1994, the Appellate Court of Illinois held, in In re
Baby Boy Doe, that no balancing test should be used to weigh a viable
fetus's rights against the right of a competent woman to refuse a ce-
sarean section even if honoring the woman's refusal might harm the
fetus.202 The oxygen supply to a thirty-five week old fetus was slowly
being cut off as a result of a placental malfunction. 203 The obstetrician
recommended that labor be induced or a cesarean performed in or-
der to prevent retardation or death. 204 The mother refused, in part on
religious grounds, stating that her faith in God's healing powers com-
pelled her to await natural childbirth.205 The court then made three
specific findings: (1) the fetus would be viable outside the womb
without any medical assistance; (2) the chances that the fetus would
survive natural childbirth were close to zero; and (3) the odds of the
mother dying from a cesarean section were about one in 10,000. 206
The court analogized Baby Boy Doe to cases protecting an individ-
ual's right to refuse medical treatment including life sustaining treat-
ment, the right to bodily integrity and the privilege of not being com-
pelled to undergo medical procedures for the benefit of a third '
2°° See McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91, 92.
201 See Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d at 330.
2°2 See id. The state argued that the fetus's own right to life should be weighed against
the mother's right to consent to or decline medical treatment. See id. Three years later, in
In re Brown, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed and extended Baby Boy Doe, holding that
the state's interest in preserving the life of a viable fetus was also insufficient to compel a
pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment On behalf of that fetus. Ste 689 N.E.2d
397, 406 (111. App. Ct. 1997). At issue in Brown was a mother's refusal, on religious
grounds, to accept a blood transfusion. See id. On appeal, the court held that the trial
court had been wrong to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the fetus and order that
the blood transfusion be performed over the mother's objections. See id.; John J. Paris.
Planning on a Miracle: The Case of Mother Versus Fetus, 111 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 244, available
in 1994 WL 13156725 for a discussion of Baby Boy Doe and two additional, similar cases.
203 See Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d at 327.
204
 See id.
205
 See id.
206 See id. at 328.
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party. 207
 Adopting the reasoning of other courts confronted with simi-
lar disputes, the court found that it was the "woman's decision, not
the fetus's interest [that was] the only dispositive factor." 208
 Citing
Curran and Pescinski, the court analogized the invasiveness of a cesar-
ean section to a kidney or bone marrow harvest:
If a sibling cannot be forced to donate bone marrow to save
a sibling's life, if an incompetent brother cannot be forced
to donate a kidney to save the life of his dying sister, then
surely a mother cannot be forced to undergo a cesarean sec-
tion to benefit her viable fetus. 2®
Lastly, the court painted a graphic picture of the way in which com-
pelled medical treatment on a competent adult would need to be car-
ried out, highlighting how alien such a practice is in our society.")
Therefore, the court not only determined that the woman's funda-
mental rights to autonomy and bodily integrity should be protected,
but that the third party's interest (in this case, the fetus) should not
even be factored into the analysis. 211
These recent cases indicate that a competent adult's right to de-
cline a surgical procedure for the benefit of a third party continues to
be entitled to fierce protection. On the other hand, as discussed in
the next section, the notion that parents and guardians have the
authority to compel a minor or incompetent to undergo a surgical
207 See id. at 331 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277
(1990)). See generally In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1989).
2°8 See Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d at 332 (citing In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237
(D.C. 1990) (en banc)).
209 Id. at 333-34 (citations omitted). In dicta, Baby Boy Doe distinguished between com-
pelling a major bodily intrusion, such as a cesarean section or an organ harvest, for the
sake of the fetus, and compelling a minor bodily intrusion, such as a blood transfusion. See
id. at 334. Three years later, the same court confronted a similar dilemma and explicitly
disagreed with Baby Boy Doe's characterization of a blood transfusion as a minor bodily
invasion. See Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405.
210 See Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d at 335 (quoting A. 573 A2d at 1261 n.8). In Baby Boy
Doe, the court stated: 'Enforcement could be accomplished only through physical force or
its equivalent. [The mother] would have to be fastened with restraints to the operating
table, or perhaps ... rendered unconscious by forcibly injecting her with an anesthetic,
and then subjected to unwanted major surgery. Such actions would surely give one pause
in a civilized society, especially when [the mother] had done no wrong." Id. Three years
later, a similar tone of disapproval attended the court's comment that the mother in Brown
had been physically restrained and sedated in order to perform the blood transfusion over
her objections. See Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 400.
211 See Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E,2d at 326.
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procedure for the benefit of a third party threatens to become a legal
presumption.
C. Petitions to Harvest Organs Pave the Way for New Legal Dilemmas
Law students learn early on about the treacherous slippery slope
and its use as a rhetorical weapon to justify a court's refusal to recog-
nize new rights and privileges. It is unusual, however, to find an opin-
ion that starkly represents the actual slide down that slope 712 In 1997,
in Ferrell v. Rosenbaum, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the right of a leukemic child to have a sibling conceived who
might provide her with bone marrow.213 The mother brought suit
against her daughter's geneticist claiming that his failure to timely
diagnose the child's leukemia constituted medical malpractice. 214 The
mother claimed that by the time the diagnosis was made, she and the
father were estranged, and, therefore, the geneticist's negligence
robbed the mother of the opportunity to conceive additional children
who might serve as bone marrow donors 215
The court opined that it was the loss of the opportunity to survive
(in the form of a potential sibling's bone marrow), rather than the
loss of survival itself, that constituted the alleged harm. 216
 The court's
analysis of the cause in fact turned on a series of hypotheticals: if the
diagnosis had been timely made, and the parents had decided to con-
ceive another child and they had been successful in conceiving a child
who was not only a suitable match but who did not suffer from the
same genetic . defect, then the chances the child would recover from a
bone marrow transplant were in the range of seventy-five to eighty
percent.217 The court overturned the lower court's grant of summary
212 See generally Ferrell v. Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641 (D.C. 1997).
213 See id. at 651.
214 See id. at 643. The undisputed evidence of medical malpractice was damning: the
child was born with obvious and severe physical deformities including undersized and
immature thumbs and a lack of external ear canals, both symptoms of a progressive and
fatal form of leukemia called Fanconi anemia. See id. at 643-44. On the basis of these
physical abnormalities, the geneticist ordered a series of diagnostic tests, including a
chromosome test. See id. The tests confirmed the child's condition, but in his deposition
the geneticist admitted that he never reviewed the results, nor the results of additional
tests taken over the next year. Sce id. at 649 n.15.
213 See id. at 644, 651. The parents separated when the child was two. The mother sub-
sequently lost touch with the father At the time of the hearing, the father was believed to
be homeless somewhere in California. See id. at 644.
212 See id. at 651.
217 See Ferrell, 691 A.2d at 650-52. The mother argued that the odds of conceiving a
baby that was a genetic match but who did not share the same genetic defect were 18.75%.
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judgment for the doctor/defendant, holding that a reasonable jury
could find the doctor violated the standard of care, and furthermore,
that the misdiagnosis was a substantial factor in the harm visited on
the child because it precluded her from her best chance of obtaining
a matched sibling donor.218
The dissent argued that whether the father would have been will-
ing to conceive other children was speculative at best, particularly
given that the parents had separated when the child was only two
years old. 219
 The mother's assertion that he would have been willing
to conceive additional children or reconcile with the mother lacked
any evidentiary support.220
 Without that crucial link in the chain, the
dissent concluded that the mother could not prove that the geneti-
cist's negligence was a substantial factor in the alleged harm.221 The
majority responded that the father would only have needed to donate
sperm; therefore, whether the parents reconciled was irrelevant. 222
The court concluded that if a jury found a breach of the standard of
care, "thatbreach was a proximate cause of [the child's] injury."225
Femell's alleged right has no precedent in case or statutory law,
but does have practical' and popular roots. 224
 Pediatric oncologists and
cancer treatment centers have for many years known and approved
families' decisions to conceive children as bone marrow donors. 225
See id. at 652. See also Kearney R Caplan, supra note 83, at 268 (noting, curiously without
comment, that the odds can be improved through "an incestuous conception between a
parent and a child").
218 See Ferrell, 691 A.2d at 651.
219
 See id. at 653 (Terry, J., dissenting).
22° See id. As the whereabouts of the father were unknown, this line of argument was
based exclusively on the mother's assertion at her deposition.
221
 See id.
222 See id. at 652. The Ferrell court's offhand remark equating fatherhood with sperm
donor is consistent with its implicit acceptance of the practice of conceiving donor babies.
Both view children and fathers in terms of their organs and bodily fluids with no thought
to their value as functioning members of a family or their worth and dignity as individual
human. beings. See id. Robertson adopts a similar posture in his chapter entitled "Farming
the Uterus." See CHILDREN Or CHOICE, supra note 34, at 197-219. For a thought-provoking
discussion of the ethical and legal dilemmas posed by the related practice of harvesting
sperm front dead and comatose men, see Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, N.Y. TIMES
Mac., March 28, 1999. at 62.
2" See Ferrell, 691 A.2d at 652.
224 See B.D. Coles, The Price of Life; Marrow-Donor Babies; Conception for Utility Raises
Moral, Ethical Stakes, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1990, at 5 (interviewing ethicists and physicians
around the country about their views on the Ayala case and the general practice of con-
ceiviiig children as bone marrow donors) [hereinafter Price of Life).
228 See id. The head of the division of research inununology and bone marrow nuns-
plantation at Los Angeles Children's Hospital is quoted as saying, I've been doing marrow
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The practice came to popular attention in the early 1990s when the
Ayala family publicly announced their decision to conceive a donor
baby, despite their ages and the need to reverse the father's vasec-
tomy.226 Their experience drew a great deal of attention and, while
ethicists questioned the practice, the popular sentiment was over-
whelmingly positive. 227 Less well known, however, is the incidence of
abortion for fetuses which fail to match or the incidence of adoption
for babies conceived as donors. 228 The Ferrell decision, therefore,
rested on the presumption that parents not only. have the authority to
harvest bone marrow from a matching sibling, but can freely con-
ceive, abort or put up for adoption children who serve as donors or
who fail in their function as organ donor. 228
III. ANALYSIS
Courts confronted with petitions to compel children and men-
tally disabled adults to undergo surgical invasions for the benefit of
third parties analyze the petitions in tennis of costs and benefits. 23°
Courts confronted with competent adults, on the other hand, have
refused this approach on the grounds that it would violate the indi-
vidual's right to autonomy and bodily integrity. 281 Differences between
legally competent and incompetent individuals do not justify the dif-
transplants for 20 years ... and I can think back to 1974 to families where I knew the child
was conceived [as a marrow donor]." Id.
228 See CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 34, at 213-14. Both parents were over forty. See
id.; see also Marissa Ayala, supra note 34, at 78.
227 See, e.g., Matisse Ayala, supra note 34, at 79; Price of Life, supra note 224.
228 See Price of Life, supra note 224 (reporting the case of a couple who conceived a
bone marrow match and then gave the child up for adoption); Gianelli, supra note 43
(reporting the case of a couple who wished to conceive, test and abort fetuses until they
conceived a bone marrow match); see also CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 34, at 213-14;
but see Kearney & Capkm, supra note 83, at 269 (asserting that no such cases have actually
been reported).
2" See Ferrell, 691 A.24 at 651.
2" The cost-benefit analysis has been criticized elsewhere as vague and standardless.
See generally Lebit, supra note 136; Robertson, supra note 14.
231 See Greatest Gift, supra note 3, at 620-21 (noting that one state statute that indeed
imposes a duty to rescue "does not in any way attempt to place the value of one life over
the value of another," but that a law compelling an individual to submit to a medical pro-
cedure on behalf of a third party would necessarily assume "that one individual's right to
be free front 'danger of peril' is somehow less important than another's similar right").
Friedman argues that expanding the doctrine to compel Good Samaratanism "cannot
legally or ethically be maintained." See id. at 619. But see Huffman, supra note 17, at 414-15
(suggesting a "construct" by which plaintiffs who satisfy certain criteria may obtain a court
order and compel a reluctant donor to cooperate under threat of civil and criminal liabil-
ity).
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ferent analyses.232
 Moreover, the information on which the cost and
benefit determinations have been based is incorrect, incomplete and
hence, misleading. 233
• A. Costs and Benefits: The Math Is All Wrong
Courts authorizing organ harvests from legal incompetents have
relied on a number of mistaken and interrelated assumptions: (1) the
surgical risks of an organ harvest constitute the only risks; (2) the
transplant will ensure the survival of the ill sibling; (3) the survival of
the sibling will ensure the integrity and well-being of the sibling rela-
tionship and family as a whole; and (4) the donor will benefit psycho-
logically from his or her participation in the process. 2M Unfortunately,
research indicates that each element of this house-of-cards
justification is subject to question. 235
 For starters, the physical risks of
surgery are not the only risks to which donors are exposed 2 3  In fact,
the psychological harm of compelling donation may be grave, the
physical benefit to the recipient may be small and the relationship
between donor-recipient pairs may be permanently damaged. 237
1. Information Deficits Regarding the Costs of Harvesting Organs
Because courts have ignored or been unaware of the psychologi-
cal toll of being compelled to donate an organ, judicial assessments of
the potential harm have been greatly underestimated. Courts apply-
ing a cost-benefit analysis to organ harvest petitions have generally
measured the cost to donors in three ways: (1) the risk that death or
serious injury will result from the harvest; (2) the temporary or per-
2" See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (II 1989) (stating: "No right is
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every in-
dividual to the possession and control of (the individual's} own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law? (in-
ternal quotations omitted)).
2" See infra notes 234-75 and accompanying text.
234 See generally Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); In re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (per curiam). But el Lawse v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps., 434 N.W.2d 895
(Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (noting that family members may rarely be able to give an informed
consent to donate an organ because of pressure from family and medical personnel).
255 supra notes 69-77, 89-94 and accompanying text (health prospects for trans-
plant recipients); supra notes 85-88, 120 and accompanying text (estrangement of donor-
recipients post-transplant); supra note 43 and accompanying text (harvesting procedures).
236
 See supra notes 46-94 and accompanying text.
217 See Kallich & Merz, supra note 11, at 145 (noting that "considerable disagreement
exists in the field of transplantation regarding the risks of donation ...."); supra notes 85-
88, 120 and accompanying text.
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manent physical changes that the harvest will cause; and (3) the over-
all level of surgical complication or invasiveness of the procedure. 238
By measuring the costs to the incompetent in physical terms, courts
have implied that absent a physical harm, there can be no psychologi-
cal harm.239 Research has shown this to be an incorrect implication.240
As noted in Part I, to date, only one study has focused on the ef-
fects of organ harvests on minor sibling-donors—that is, on the psy-
chological effects of being volunteered by one's parents to donate
bone marrow to an ill sibling.241 That study revealed that the young
donors were withdrawn, anxious, depressed, had lowered self-esteem
and exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. 242 Although
the body of research into the psychological effects of organ harvests
on adult sibling-donors is far from robust, it supplements the little
evidence we have regarding incompetent donors. The latter studies
reveal that even the most favorable circumstances attending an adult
donor's participation do not necessarily insulate him or her from psy-
chological harm.243 Donors are often plagued by the worry that the
donor's bone marrow will immunologically attack the recipient's body
or that the kidney will be rejected. 244 Rather than mark the turning
point for patients and families after a prolonged and debilitating ill-
ness, the transplant can mark the beginning of a grueling treatment
process that leads to a death more agonizing than death from the un-
derlying disease. 245 The donor's guilt from having caused or contrib-
uted to that suffering can be great. 246 These harms occur among adult
sibling donors even when the decision to donate is voluntary, even
when there is an established relationship between the donor and re-
cipient and even when the ill family member becomes a long-term,
=See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386,389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (noting that kidney
donor would only be restricted from contact sports and the surgery would only last two
and one-half hours); Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933 (noting that bone marrow harvest posed
minimal medical risk). But see Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344-45. Although Curran turned on
the psychological effects on the young donors, the psychological harm that so concerned
the court was limited to the mother's inability to provide the twins the necessary emotional
support; the court was either unaware of or unconcerned about the potential psychologi-
cal harm flowing from participation in the bone marrow harvest itself. See id.
259 See Hart, 289 A.2d at 389; Doe, 481 N.YS.2d at 933.
240 See supra notes 38-90 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
242
 SeeKaarela, supra note 33.
245 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
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disease-free survivor. 247
 Favorable circumstances, however, are often
absent; pressure to donate can be coercive and family dynamics and
agendas often subtly—or overtly—guide selection of the donor.243
 As a
consequence, the potential for psychological harm rises. 249
Perhaps more importantly, evidence that adult related donors
suffer psychological harm should sound an alarm for those con-
cerned about the welfare of children and mental incompetents pre-
cisely because of key differences between the two sets of people:
adults have real world options and internal resources that are simply
unavailable to the legal incompetent.250
 Being an adult means making
choices that are guided by and, in turn, contribute to the develop-
ment of one's internal moral compass. 251
 Furthermore, being an adult
means that even if one feels compelled to act, ultimately one chooses
to give in to the compulsion.252
 Unlike children and mentally disabled
adults, adult prospective donors have the maturity and legal standing
to decline to be tested for compatibility or to bring the organ pro-
curement process to a halt at any time. 253
 Ambivalent and fearful, yet
psychiatrically stable, adults may even be provided with mock medical
reasons to relieve them of further family pressure and excuse them
from any familial obligation.254
To the extent that courts adjudicating organ harvest petitions
recognize the potential for psychological harm, they answer it by invit-
ing experts to testify. 255
 Courts hope this testimony will reveal any un-
seemly intention guiding the parent or guardian's selection of the
247 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
21° See BMT Donors, supra note 33, at 487 (noting researchers' concerns that because es-
tranged donors and recipients refused to participate in the study, the difficulties reported
by the study participants were only the "tip of the iceberg").
25° See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
251
 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
255
 See, e.g., McFall v. %imp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90,91-92 (1978) (refusing to compel a
competent adult to undergo a bone marrow harvest for the benefit of his cousin); In re
Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180,183 (Wisc. 1975) (Day, J., dissenting) (noting the "impractical-
ity" of obtaining an organ from another brother when, in fact, the brother had simply
exercised his right to refuse to donate); ef niedinan Ross, supra note 16. During the ex-
perimental phase of a living donor liver-transplantation program, parents of small children
with liver disease underwent a psychiatric evaluation. When asked about their willingness
to donate a portion of their livers the parents were able to say no even when the lives of
their children were at tisk and no alternative therapies (such as dialysis) were available."
See id.
254 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
255 See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 389-90.
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particular donor or that it will indicate whether the selected donor
runs a particular risk of sustaining psychological harm. 256 This evalua-
tion process, however, offers little protection to the average child or
mentally disabled adult for two reasons. First, it suggests that only the
rare individual, either because of extraordinary circumstances or a
predisposition to psychiatric problems, will suffer psychological
harm.257 Second, it assumes that a certain level of fear and uncertainty
is acceptable—an assumption courts will not make about competent
adults. 258 Moreover, in the rare circumstance that a child or mentally
disabled adult does attempt to say "no" to the harvest, medical per-
sonnel and family members treat the incompetent as merely afraid,
not unwilling.259 The ambivalent and fearful, yet psychiatrically stable,
child or mentally retarded adult will not receive the graceful exit from
the process that the competent adult is entitled to. Rather, he or she
can expect a sympathetic hand to hold while being put under anes-
thesia and, perhaps, counseling post-harvest to help integrate the ex-
perience of having been compelled to undergo the surgery. 26° How-
ever, neither the process by which children and mentally disabled
adults become donors, nor a post-facto therapeutic Band-Aid can
256 See id. at 374; Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App. 1979, writ denied).
25 See Curran, .566 N.E.2d at 1338, 1343 (predisposition to psychological harm meas-
ured in terms of the mother's inability, because of her objections to the bone marrow har-
vest, to provide emotional support during the frightening, unfamiliar hospital procedure).
But see Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499. The Little court noted that the donor who had Down's
Syndrome had a "high threshold for pain" but that her limited intelligence might make
the experience "more burdensome" than it would be for an adult, These factors, however,
did not, apparently, amount to any peculiar disposition for psychological harm nor un-
usual circumstance warranting the court's concern. See id. at 499.
258 See Curra n, 566 N.E.2d at 1338.
The very young donor is going to be afraid to come into the hospital, just like
any three and a half year old would be. We show them the place that they'll
be staying. In many cases we'll take them up to the operating room and show
them that. We can use play therapy with a doll or with a teddy bear.... We
have facilities for the parent to stay with the child both before and after the
procedure.
Id.; see also Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499.
259 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1338, 1343; see also Baron, supra note 8, at 191.
260See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1338, 1343 (noting that the consent and emotional sup-
port of the parent "is important to ease the fears associated with such an unfamiliar proce-
dure"); see also Baron, supra note 8, at 191 (reporting a Maryland court that left open the
question of whether the medical providers would be "required to offer the donor follow-
up psychiatric care.").
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remedy the fundamental wrong of placing these individuals in the
role of family rescuer. 26I
That this complex array of psychological harms has gone largely
unnoticed by courts confronted with petitions to harvest organs from
legal incompetents is made all the more troubling by the fact that the
benefits imputed to the incompetents are entirely psychological. 262
 Psy-
chological benefits cannot accurately be measured if psychological
harms have been omitted from the equation. And, as discussed below,
one must question whether courts are correct to impute the psycho-
logical benefits of an altruistic adult donor to the incompetent who is
compelled to donate an organ. 253
2. Information Deficits Regarding the Benefits of Harvesting Organs
As noted above, courts underestimate the costs associated with
donating organs by omitting the psychological costs. At the same
time, courts inflate the benefits side of the equation by adding theo-
retical psychological benefits.264
 That courts are willing to entertain
speculation about psychological benefits is understandable: organ
transplants provide no medical benefit to the donor, therefore any
benefit would have to be psychological.265 Nevertheless, research does
not support the optimism that attends the speculations.266
In every reported case in which an organ transplant has been
permitted, courts have relied on the assumption that the compelled
donor would realize one of two psychological benefits: the opportu-
nity to maintain a relationship with the recipient-sibling and the psy-
chological benefit of having acted altruistically.267
 Taking these
261 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1338,1343. But see Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499.
262 See Hart, 289 A.2d at 387 (noting that transplant will lead to the family being
"happy" rather than "distressed"); Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933 (noting that donor will benefit
front advocacy and company of recipient); cf. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344-45 (noting that
donors lacked sufficient relationship with sibling-patient to expect them to benefit psycho-
logically). Baron notes that it is the rare guardian ad litem who fights the petition to
authorize an organ harvest. See Baron, supra note 8, at 184-85. More commonly, all parties
come to the court having already agreed that the recipient's benefits outweigh the donor's
harms. See id. This may explain the lack of judicial ink on the subject.
263
 See infra notes 269-86 and accompanying text.
264 See Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499; infra notes 269-86 and accom-
panying text.
265 See supra notes 81-84,114 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
267 See Hart, 289 A.2d at 387; Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933; cf. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344
(denying petition to compel a bone marrow harvest where there was no established rela-
tionship befween the half-siblings).
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benefits in turn, the expectation that the sibling relationship will be
unaffected or improved by the transplant may go unmet. 268 The link
between donors and recipients is such that the donor's psychological
well-being and a continued relationship with the recipient may de-
pend on the recipient's perception of his or her ongoing well-being
and the long-term success of the transplant.269 Aggressive cancer
treatments, however, often offer no more than a minimal chance of
survival, yet carry a significant risk that the treatment will harm the
patient or lead to a painful and protracted death. 276 In addition, the
treatment can exact a huge financial and emotional toll on the fam-
ily?" Therefore, because transplants rarely yield a return to perfect
health, the link between donors and recipients created by the trans-
plant can lead to a deterioration in the quality and strength of the
ongoing relationship. 272 Moreover, the benefits of an enhanced or on-
going relationship may not manifest even if the transplant is a medical
success.273 If the donor was at all ambivalent about donating, the re-
cipient may forever hold it against him despite the fact that he ulti-
mately came through.274 The recipient's feelings of debt or guilt from
having needed so great a sacrifice from the donor can also create an
unbridgeable gap between the two family members. 275
Alternatively, courts impute to volunteered children and mentally
disabled adults the psychological benefits that may flow to competent
adult volunteers. 276 Courts and commentators use words like "dona-
tion," "gift" and "altruism" to support this assignment of benefits. 277
Neither the language nor the imputed benefits reflect the experience
268 See supra notes 81-84, 111-14 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
270 See grnerally Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Del. 1990). The Neuman*
court upheld the parent's right to refuse an aggressive course of cancer treatment which
doctors believed was the only hope for their three-year-old leukemic child. See id. at 1110.
Doctors considered the treatment "the most aggressive form of cancer therapy short of a
bone marrow transplant." See id. at 1118. if the treatment itself did not kill the bo)% it
would offer him a forty.percent chance of survival, meastued not in terms of cure, but in
terms of living for two additional years, cancer free. See id. at 1118, 1119 n.12.
271 See id.
272 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 81-84, 111-14 and accompanying text.
274 See supra note 82.
275 See Girr OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 171-72; supra note 90 and accompanying text.
276
 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1325, 1344-45; Baron, supra note 8, at 178.
277 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1325, 1344-45; Baron, supra note 8, at 178; Robbennolt,
supra note 10, at 228 (arguing that the best interests standard is flawed precisely because it
"imposes self-seeking values upon children" and "fails to allow [them] to act altruisti-
cally.").
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of the legally incompetent individual compelled to undergo a surgical
invasion for the benefit of a third party. 278
 Commentators argue that
retaining the language. of voluntariness reminds us that parents have
beneficent motives when they involve their children in the organ pro-
curement process.279
 Compassion for parents, however, is an in-
sufficient justification for employing euphernisms. 28° While the term
"organ donor" is an efficient catchall phrase for the process by which
human organs are obtained for transplantation, in this context, verbal
efficiency masks meaningful differences between the affirmative act of
giving and the passive experience of having something taken away. 281
Concerns about coercive family pressure, physical and psycho-
logical harm, the proper respect for individual autonomy and inap-
propriately imputed psychological benefits are intensified for the
child conceived as an organ donor. 282
 Those who approve of, or who
are at least unwilling to criticize these practices argue that question-
able, selfish motives often underlie people's decisions to have a child
or terminate a pregnancy. 285
 If we are not going to police every deci-
sion, so the argument goes, then we cannot police any decision. 284
 But
this view glosses over a material difference between conceiving chil-
dren who may, as individuals, serve their parents' ends and conceiving
278 cf. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334 (psychiatrist testified that young "mentally and
physically healthy children do not understand abstract concepts such as death because
they just haven't had the opportunity to have cognitive development sufficient to manage
things like abstractions, hypotheses, and so on.") (internal quotes omitted).
279
 See Kearney & Caplan, supra note 83, at 264.
280 See Dobson, .supra note 81 ("Adults are not usually compelled to display altruism,
but children are regularly 'volunteered' by their parents.").
281 See id.; supra notes 78-84,98-125 and accompanying text.
sae
	 Kearney & Caplan, supra note 83, at 274. in the immediacy of the desire to save
the life of a family ntembei; there may be an undue emphasis on the conceived child's
purpose in saving another life. This could arise from the parents themselves, their families,
or others in their community...." Id.
283
 Professor George Annas of Boston University Law School was quoted as saying:
"'Me're going to have to depend upon the good sense of the medical conununity to
discourage this, and so far the medical community hasn't shown much sense. 1 hope we
don't get to ... where we have to legislate this, but we will if it becomes a big thing.'" Price
of Life, supra note 224; see Kearney & Caplan, supra note 83, at 282. But see CHILDREN OF
CHOICE, supra note 34. at 211-17. Robertson argues that the only difference between con-
ceiving with the intention to "farm the uterus" for tissue and then aborting versus conceiv-
ing and then deciding to abort for any other personal reason is purely symbolic. See id. at
213-14. "Deliberate creation of fetuses to be aborted for tissue procurement is more ethi-
cally complex and defensible than its current widespread dismissal would suggest." Id. at
214.
284 See CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 34, at 215; Price of Life, supra note 224 (quoting
the director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at Case Western Reserve Medical School
in Cleveland that few decisions to have children can "stand up to rational scrutiny.").
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children whose body parts may serve their parents' ends.288 In the for-
mer case, the children will inevitably grow into adults and, as adults,
will have the autonomy to choose to fulfill or disappoint their parents'
expectations. 285 Children conceived as organ donors, on the other
hand, are never given the opportunity to break from their parents'
expectations by making their own choices.287 Parity for donation—the
act of conceiving a child to prothice an organ donor—reflects a dis-
sected view of children that is incompatible with current understand-
ings of the psychological development of identity and the social and
legal concepts. of individual autonomy. 288 Prohibiting harvests from
minors and Mentally disabled adults is the only way to eliminate the
incentive to conceive children to create matching donors.289
When it overturned the lower'court's decision granting summary
judgment to the geneticist, Ferrell v. Rosenbaum recognized the legal
viability of the mother's novel claim that medical negligence robbed
her of the opportunity to conceive potential. bone marrow donor-
siblings for her daughter. 2" In recognizing the claim, Ferrell took one
giant step toward recognizing one individual's right to claim the or-
gan of another."' What happens then to the family who refuses to
conceive another baby, or the family that refuses to volunteer its other
children to be tested for compatibility? 292
 Might a court find that a
parents' duty to care for an ill child extends to compelling the parents
285 See Price of Life, supra note 224 (quoting a senior associate from one of the nation's
leading bioethics think tanks, "[i]t's the classic nightmare of using people as tissue and
organ banks, and ... we have to respond to it as the classic nightmare. There's a revulsion
that ... ldck[s] in.").
286
 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT, 151-74 (2d ed. 1993).
287 See Price of Life, supra note 224 (stating: "What is the purpose of any human being or
child? ... [I] t's not to be used as an object fOr another person").
288
 See id.
289
 See id.
20 See 691 A.2d 641, 651 (D.C. 1997) (vacating the superior court's grant of summary
judgment on the grounds that the geneticist's negligence was a substantial factor in the
child's injury).
291
 See id.
492 See Kearney & Caplan, supra note 83, at 279 (expressing the concern that to the ex-
tent the state's interest in a woman's reproductive process is unsettled, the possibility exists
that a woman could be legally compelled to conceive and carry a donor baby to term).
A 1990 news article reported that a couple consented to use their six yea•-old daugh-
ter as a bone marrow donor for their leukemic son only after a court threatened to charge
them with child abuse and remove the children from the home. See Andrea Boroff Eagan,
Who Decides for Women?, AMERICAN HEALTH, Sept. 1990, at 42. Eagan contrasts this with the
report of an Arkansas man who refused to donate bone marrow to his leukemic brother
but was left in peace. See id.
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to conceive other children as organ donors?293
 Ferrell, the Ayala story
and similar news reports transform these extreme hypotheticals into
realistic possibilities. 294
Adults experience psychic or psychological benefits when they act
without any expectation of reward and when they do not bear the
burden of the life or death of a loved one.295
 Altruistic behavior is
made possible by advances through stages of cognitive develop-
ment.296
 Children do not achieve the ability to act altruistically until
sometime in early adolescence, and mentally disabled adults may
never reach that stage. 297
 Imputing the psychological benefits of altru-
istic behavior to individuals who, because of age, cognitive ability and
circumstances cannot make altruistic choices, is myopic.298
 Whatever
lesson the child may learn from being compelled to donate an organ
or from being conceived to donate an organ, it surely will not be
about the good of giving of oneself utterly and selflessly. 299
293 See Eagan, supra note 292; cf. Bone Marrow Dispute, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,1990, at B5.
A Virginia woman filed a claim against the father of her four month-old son to compel him
to be tested for bone marrow compatibility as it was his "duty and obligation to undergo
minimally intrusive tests and', if eligible, to donate bone marrow to his son." See Eagan,
supra note 292; cf. Bone Marrow Dispute, supra, at B5 (internal quotes omitted). USA Today
followed the story and interviewed ethicists who logged their disapproval of compelling a
parent to donate to their child. See Andrea Stone, Father Sued for Bone Marrow, USA TODAY,
Jan. 19,1990, at 3A. The new reports noted that the woman had repeatedly pleaded with
the father to come forward and he had refused. A week after the story broke, however, the
claim was dropped when the father underwent tests, claiming that he had been unaware
that a sample of his blood had been sought. See id.
29• See Kearney & Caplan, supra note 83, at 279; Eagan, supra note 292.
"3
 Cf. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1335 (reporting psychiatrist's testimony that whether a
child feels guilty about not having donated will depend entirely on the parent taking re-
sponsibility for having made a difficult decision and not laying the burden on the child);
see GIFT OF LIFE, supra note 16, at 444-45.
296
 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334; see also supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
297 See Nathan Seppa, Teens' Altruism Grows Like They Do-In Spurts, APA MONITOR, June
1996; cf. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334 (noting a psychiatrist's testimony that "mentally and
physically healthy children do not understand abstract concepts such as death because
they just haven't had the opportunity to have cognitive development sufficient to manage
things like abstractions, hypotheses, and so on.").
298 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334; Seppa, supra note 297; supra notes 103-125 and ac-
companying text.
299 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334; Seppa, supra note 297; supra notes 103-125 and ac-
companying text.
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B. No Judicial Standard or Adjudicative Proceeding Will Uniformly Lead to
the Proper Result
Adjudicating petitions to harvest organs on a case-by-case basis
tempts judges to stretch legal doctrine to the breaking point in order
to reach what they hope is the least regrettable decision." 0 The
heartwrenching issues these petitions involve make this inevitable. 301
Commentators have suggested various methods of correcting the in-
herent dangers of the current system, including adopting stricter,
more clearly defined standards, changing the forum in which the pe-
titions are heard and assigning experienced guardians ad litem to all
donors."2 None of these proposals, however, goes to the heart of the
problem; case-by-case adjudications are inherently flawed because
they substitute the consent and judgment of a third-party decision-
maker for the consent and judgment of the individual undergoing the
surgical invasion."3 It is immaterial whether that third-party deci-
sionmaker is a judge or a board of impartial experts, whether the de-
cision is made by a state court or an administrative board, or whether
more advocates are added to the complicated mix of people already
involved in these petition. 504 The harm is done when substitute deci-
5°1) See Hart, 289 A.2d at 390. The Hart court expressed the dilemma: "[The] question
before this court is whether it should abandon the [recipient] to a brief medically compli-
cated life and eventual death or permit the ... parents to take some action based on rea-
son and medical probability in order to keep both children alive." Id.; see also Baron, supra
note 8, at 183.
5431 See Hart, 289 A.2d at 390; Baron, supra note 8, at 183.
3°2 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 8, at 187 (suggesting that guardians ad litem be ap-
pointed for all donors, that all guardians be members of an established panel to ensure
that the attorneys in that role have some expertise in the area and further, that proceed-
ings take place in probate court because probate judges deal daily with "intrafamily
conflict and tension"); Linda Delaney et al., Altruism by Proxy: Volunteering Children for Bone
Marrow Donation; Opinions of Various Professionals, 312 BRITISH MED.J. 240 (1996) (suggest-
ing that "a forum, independent of the parents and medical advisers" made up, perhaps, of
independent medical social workers should be responsible for deciding the petitions);
Griner, supra note 101, at 608-10 (advocating adoption of a rebuttable presumption
against harvesting organs from minors which could only be overcome by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the donor would benefit physically or financially): Lebit, supra note
136, at 127-29 (suggesting a "higher scrutiny best interests standard" which would require
clear and convincing evidence that a compelled procedure is in the child or mentally dis-
abled adult's best interests, the evidence to be provided in large part by the legal, medical
and philosophical communities).
305 See Baron, supra note 8, at 187; Delaney, supra note 302; Griner; supra note 101, at
608-10; Lebit, supra note 136, at 127-29.
304 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417. 428
(Mass. 1977).1n Saihewiez, the court stated:
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sionmakers make the kind of intensely personal and medically unnec-
essary decision on behalf of an incompetent that few would suggest
ought to be made on behalf of a competent individual. 305
Criticizing those decisions that reached the wrong result does not
get us very fat; however. Rather, Curran, the decision that reached the
right result after applying a closely tailored best interest analysis, best
illuminates the dangers inherent in adjudicating these petitions case-
by case. The Curran court denied the father's petition to harvest
bone marrow from his three year-old twins for the benefit of their
half-brother?" The court articulated a three factor test to determine
whether the organ harvest was in the best interests of the minor
twins. 308
 Curran's test focused on the need for the parents' informed
consent to the procedure, their willingness to emotionally support the
donor and the closeness of the relationship between the donor and
the ill sibling.809
Applying its tailored analysis to the facts before it, the Curran
court determined that the harvest was not in the twins' best interests
because the relationihip between the twins and their terminally ill
half brother was not close, and the custodial parent was unwilling to
consent to the harvest and therefore, unable to emotionally support
the twins.") The guidelines the Curran court injected into the for-
The significant decisions of life are more complex than statistical determina-
tions. Individual choice is determined not by the vote of the majority but by
the complexities of the singular situation viewed from the unique perspective
of the person called on to make the decision. To presume that the incompe-
tent person must always be subjected to what many rational and intelligent
persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the incompetent person by
placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality.
Id.; see also Baron, supra note 8, at 187; Delaney, supra note 302; Griner, supra note 101, at
608-10; Lebit, supra note 136, at 127-29.
WS See DoIglu, supra note 13, at 399,413-14. DoIglu further argues that substitute—or
paternalistic decisions—may inflict harm rather than protect children from harm. See id. at
413. As an example, DOlgin discusses court decisions which require young, pregnant teen-
agers to petition judges for permission to undergo abortions. See id. While adult women
may seek abortions without having to justify, or even understand, the basis of their deci-
sion, such procedures demand that the teenager be able to articulate the reasons underly-
ing her decision to seek an abortion in the intimidating setting of a judge's chamber or
courtroom. See id. at 414. Dolgin's argument is that this procedural requirement burdens,
rather than protects, a teenager's right to terminate a pregnancy. See id.
30 See generally Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990),
307 See id. at 1344.
3" See id. at 1325-26,1343-44.
109 See id.
sw See id. at 1343-44.
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merly ad hoc standard, however, do not provide legal incompetents
with any greater protection than they received from courts applying
any other standard. This is so because: (1) Curran's best interest stan-
dard relies on the same false assumption, rampant throughout these
opinions, that psychological benefits will flow to siblings who have an
established relationship and that the relationship will immunize the
donors from psychological harm: 311 and (2) the "new" standard very
much defers to parental authority—in this case, the refusal of one
parent to consent on behalf of the children. 312 Looked at through this
lens, Curran hardly lives up to the ground-breaking, controversial
reputation it seems to have developed among commentators. 313
Both the straightforward cost-benefit analysis and Curran's more
tailored benefits-only analysis distort the original purpose of the best
interest standard. 314 Rather than safeguard children from cold, mar-
ketplace realities, the analysis permits courts to put the legally incom-
petent individual's right to autonomy and bodily integrity on a
scale. 315 Whereas judicial proceedings offer legal incompetents only
minimal protection against being compelled to "act" altruistically, the
law and the medical community categorically protect competent
adults from that same compulsion. 316 Differences between the two
groups do not justify such disparity of treatment. 317 Ultimately, no ju-
dicial standard will lead consistently to the proper result because no
standard can account for the fact that children and mentally incom-
311 See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1335; supra notes 81-84, 114 and accompanying text.
512 See Curran 566 N.E. 2d at 1343; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
313 See, e.g., Dufault, supra note 37, at 230; Robbennolt, supra note 10, at 216-17.
314 See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 361.
315
	 Curran, 566 N.E. 2d at 1339-40; el Patricia Huna, Infants as Organ T'ansplant
Donors: Should it Happen?, 6 Sum. HEALTH LAW. 24, 26 (1992). Huna adheres to the belief
that the best interest standard removes third-party interests from the equation and goes on
to argue that that is one of the failings of the test. See Huila, supra, at 26. Only those courts
committed to denying the parents' request, however, actually apply the test in thii way. See
generally In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In re Pescinsld, 226
N.W.2d 180 (Wisc. 1975). Courts determined to permit the harvest routinely weigh the
costs to the recipient against the benefit to the donor, and thereby, reinsert third-party
interests back into the equation. See generally In re Doe 481 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
316 see,	 In re Baby Boy Doe, 623 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); McFall V.
10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90 (1978). For two arguments that adults should be com-
pelled to be tested or donate organs, see generally Anderson, supra note 98, and Huffman,
supra note 17.
517 See Griner, supra note 101, at 608.
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petent adults are not only unable to give a meaningful, fully in-
formed, legally valid "yes," they are also unable to simply say "no.” 318
C. Organ Harvests from Children and Mentally Disabled Adults Should Be
Prohibited
The presumption that parents and children are not adversaries
with disparate interests is deeply rooted in this country's jurispru-
dence and legislation, and for good reason. 519
 The state has an inter-
est in preserving and protecting family autonomy because the family
unit is able to fulfill social functions that the state may be unable or
less able to fulfill. 52° Although parents have a fundamental tight to
control the environment in which a child grows, that right should not
extend to invading one child's body in the hope that another child
might benefit. 521
 Deference to a parent's desire and authority merely
assumes away the problem of how to adequately protect the disparate
interests of all family members when those interests collide. 322
The roles that family members play within their small social units
have undergone significant shifts in the past thirty years. 323
 No longer
must people silently lose their individuality and autonomy as a neces-
319 See Dobson, supra note 81; supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
319 'The state cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries." Griffith,
supra note 4, at 315 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (termination of
parental rights)); but see Baron, supra note 8, at 186 (arguing that despite the "natural dis-
taste" for subjecting family members to an adversarial, judicial proceeding, "here, as in
int•afamily and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the imposition of some emotional bur-
dens on family members is necessary because the interests protected by the process are
substantial and the costs of using a nonadversarial system are quite high.").
329 See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 363. The family unit is the optimal social structure for
"preparing children to become productive members of society, developing religious and
cultural diversity among citizens, and fulfilling support obligations that would otherwise
fall to the state." See Griffith, supra note 4, at 289.
321 See Wisconsin v. Ibder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating that the "primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."). However, while "[p] arents may be free to become martyrs
themselves it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs
of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves." See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944). For an examination of more recent Supreme Court opinions touching on the con-
stitutional rights of children to make choices for themselves that differ from those of their
parents, see generally Dolgin, supra note 13.
322 See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Co, Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(denying claim that the state has a constitutional duty to protect a child from parental
abuse notwithstanding the state's awareness of the abuse and the child's resulting perma-
nent disability).
323
 SeeDolgin, supra note 13, at 364.
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sary consequence of their family membership. 324 Understandings
about child development and the abilities of the mentally disabled
have undergone a similar change. 325 No longer are children viewed as
simply miniature-sized adults, nor the mentally disabled viewed as de-
fective human beings. 326 Emerging technologies, shifting social
demographics, and developments in the social and brain sciences are
just some of the factors that have contributed to this evolution of fam-
ily and society. 327 As a society evolves, so must its body of law.
Sometimes, it is the common law that can best reflect and re-
spond to baseline shifts in the social order; at other times legislative
action is necessary to adequately articulate newly defined rights and
duties and to provide guidance for how to protect and enforce these
new rights and duties.328 Previously, children who were otherwise
qualified could hold the same jobs as adults, and children as young as
twelve could legally marry. 329 Today, the age of consent in most states
has risen from twelve to eighteen; child labor laws have been passed
to keep children out of factories; and although children over fourteen
may work, their employment is subject to strict statutory guidelines. 339
These laws have restricted children's participation in adult activities,
notwithstanding the family's social or economic needs which child
labor or an early marriage might have satisfied.331
The only solution to this dilemma is legislation which requires
that an individual be legally competent to give an informed, valid
321 See id. at 357 (discussing Gnstookt and noting that the body of family case law was
almost exclusively developed during the 1960s and 1970s).
325 See Deborah Hardin Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled: Shedding Some
Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA, ST. U. L. Rev. 599, 600 n.5 (1981) (noting that historically, the
mentally retarded individual has been considered a "menace," a "subhuman organism,"
"diseased." an object of "pity," "dread" or "ridicule," or an "eternal child"). Today, medica-
tion and appropriately tailored educational opportunities permit many mentally disabled
adults to be high functioning and semi-independent. See, e.g., The Arc of the United States
(The National Organization of and for People With Mental Retardation and Related Dis-
abilities and Their Families), (visited February 1, 2000) Chttp://wwwthearc.org/>.
326 See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 361.
327 See generally Dolgin, supra note 13.
326 See id. at 370-71. The case law is "contradictory and uncertain" in its response to
the changing status of children and childhood. "[S]ometimes children . . . are assumed to
be best protected when their individuality is ... subsumed by parental authority....
[S]ometimes children are recognized as complete human beings.... Sometimes the law
reinforces parental authority even against children burdened by the exercise of that
authority." See id.
322 See id. at 361 11.84.
s" See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (1998) (child labor regulations); Dolgin, supra note 13, at 406.
ssl See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (1998) (child labor regulations); Dolgin, supra note 13, at 406.
514	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:465
consent before he or she may be a candidate for organ donation.332
Legislation which prohibits children and mentally disabled adults
from being volunteered as donors would also eliminate the incentive
parents currently have for conceiving children as donors. 333 Further-
more, legislation would effectively halt the slide down the slippery
slope threatened by the court's recognition of the malpractice claim
itt Ferre11. 334
 Our legal system should no longer condone compelled
organ harvests by resorting to idealized notions of the family and un-
realizable expectations of altruistic behavior. 336
CONCLUSION
Children and mentally disabled adults are often volunteered to
undergo surgical procedures so that third parties might benefit from
their organs, while the legal system staunchly protects the competent
adult's right to opt out of the same procedures. 336 These inequitable
results are not justified. The notion that parents, guardians and
judges adequately protect the child and mentally disabled adult's best
interests when they permit the harvests is not supported by research
regarding the adverse psychological effects that flow from organ
transplants. 337
 If the psychological benefits courts and commentators
cite are at best speculative when an individual chooses to undergo a
surgical invasion, they are impossible to predict when the surgical in-
vasion is compelled. Legislation must be drafted that eliminates vol-
unteered donors from the rolls of donor candidates, because, as long
as children and mentally disabled family members are legal organ
sources, parents, doctors and judges will be faced with the untenable
task of harming one child in the hope that another will be saved.
We live in a remarkable age—neither birthplace nor genetics
need be determinative of who we will be or how long we will live. But
the same advanced technologies that have the potential to free us
from living or dying according to a fixed blueprint also foster the view
332 See Harmon, supra note 22, at 7 (noting that one can avoid an undesirable result
from the application of a general rule of law by changing the general rule of law rather
than by fabricating a legal fiction).
333 See Ferrell v Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641, 651 (D.C. 1997).
"4
 For a thorough discussion of the constitutional objections to compelling children
and mentally disabled adults to donate organs, which, to date, only the lower court in Cur-
ran has raised, see Greatest Gift, supra note 3, at 622-26.
333 SeeDolgin, supra note 13, at 429; Robbennolt, supra note 10, at 229, 330.
"6 See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (1978); In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180,
183 (Wisc. 1975) (Day, J., dissenting); supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
s" See supra notes 56-00 and accompanying text.
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that children and the mentally disabled are no more than the sum of
their body parts. By holding out the elusive promise that death can be
cheated and all disease checked, medical technology too often tempts
parents and doctors to try to prolong life at all costs—even when it is
a child or mentally disabled adult who ends up footing the bill.
CARA CHEYETTE
